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‘[Referring to the proposed corporate manslaughter legislation in Victoria, Australia] That 
is not industrial relations; that is thuggery. It is not the criminal law; it is breach of every 
principle of the criminal law… I can just imagine the Japanese investor and his advisers’1 
 
Section One 
Providing Context 
 
The criminal law has numerous aims, often cited in introductory textbooks to include 
promoting ‘justice,’ providing norms to reduce unacceptable social behaviour, achieving 
deterrence or preventing crime, promoting rehabilitation for the law breaker, providing 
retribution against the law breaker, expressing moral concern at social harms (denunciation) 
and enabling appropriate levels of accountability (see for instance Ashworth, 1999: 16 and 
Haines and Hall, 2004). The criminal justice system is seen as a system providing meaning, 
achieving goals, and having a purpose rooted within the very foundations of all social and 
legal systems and ways of life.  
 
This paper deals with the application of the criminal law to death as a result of industrial 
activity (‘industrial deaths’ are taken here to refer to traumatic and sudden workplace deaths 
and deaths in public disasters). It discusses organisational accountability for industrial deaths 
through examining reform processes in three countries: Australia, Canada and England and 
Wales. 
 
It seems to us that ‘traditional’ criminal laws have always seemed to sit awkwardly with 
debates about the enforcement of occupational health and safety (OHS) statutes (Carson, 
1970; Carson and Johnstone, 1990; Wells, 2001). What we shall call ‘traditional’ criminal law 
(including, for instance murder, manslaughter, assault, or theft) has a meaning and invokes a 
response that seems to be at odds with society’s view of ‘regulatory’ criminal law (including, 
for instance, OHS, environmental pollution, or financial services regulation). This kind of 
regulatory criminal law is seen by some as quasi-criminal, falling within a nebulous ‘public 
welfare’ category (Carson, 1979/1980; Wells, 2001: 8), and for this reason seen as second in 
                                                 
1 Vic Hansard 14th May 2002, 1407, Dr Dean (Berwick) 
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force and power and distinct in meaning from traditional criminal law. There are some 
obvious reasons for this distinction between ‘traditional’ and ‘regulatory’ criminal law in the 
sphere of OHS, although as shall be argued throughout this paper, these are perhaps largely 
perceptual.  
 
The Australian OHS statutes (in common with those of Canada, the United Kingdom 
and most of Europe) are built around ‘general duties’ and process, performance 
standards, and documentary requirements.2 The general duties are imposed upon 
employers in relation to ‘employees’ and ‘others’; self-employed persons; persons in 
control of workplaces; designers, suppliers, importers, etc of plant and substances; and 
employees. They impose absolute (or strict) obligations in relation to OHS, qualified 
only by (‘reasonable’) practicability (see Johnstone 2004a: chapter four). In Slivak v Lurgi 
(Australia) Pty Ltd3 Gaudron J (at pp 322-323) observed, in relation to the words 
‘reasonably practicable’ that: 
 
‘three general propositions are to be discerned from the decided cases:  
• the phrase “reasonably practicable” means something narrower than “physically 
possible” or “feasible”;  
• what is “reasonably practicable” is to be judged on the basis of what was known 
at the relevant time;  
• to determine what is “reasonably practicable” it is necessary to balance the 
likelihood of the risk occurring against the cost, time and trouble necessary to 
avert that risk.’ 
 
The courts have interpreted the ‘general duties’ broadly, and have specified that they require 
a ‘pro-active, not reactive, approach’, and that duty holders ‘should be on the offensive to 
search for, detect and eliminate, so far as is reasonably practicable, any possible areas of risk 
to safety, health and welfare and which may exist or occur from time to time in the 
workplace.’4  
 
                                                 
2  See for instance Johnstone (2004a: chapters four to six); the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (UK); and the 
Canadian Labour Code Part II (note however that health and safety falls under the Canadian provincial jurisdictions) 
3  (2001) 205 CLR 304   
4  WorkCover Authority of NSW (Insp Egan) v Atco Controls Pty Ltd (1998) 82 IR 80 at 85 
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The general duties are underpinned by regulations and codes of practice (called ‘advisory 
standards’ in Queensland), which include process and performance standards, and 
documentation requirements. Instead of telling duty holders exactly how they are to achieve 
compliance, performance standards define the duty holder’s duty in terms of goals they must 
achieve, or problems they must solve, and leaves it to the initiative of the duty holder to 
work out the best and most efficient method for achieving the specified standard. Process 
requirements prescribe a process, or series of steps, that must be followed by a duty holder in 
managing specific hazards, or OHS generally. They are often used when the regulator has 
difficulty specifying a goal or outcome, but has confidence that the risk of illness or injury 
will be significantly reduced if the specified process is followed. Most regulations now 
require the duty holder to identify hazards and assess and control identified risks, and to do 
so in consultation with workers. Process-based standards have spawned greater reliance on 
documentation requirements. Increasingly OHS statutes are requiring duty holders to document 
measures they have taken to comply with process-based standards, performance standards 
and general duty standards.  
 
The duties in OHS statutes are examples of what we might call ‘constitutive regulation’ 
(Hutter, 2001: chapter one), a form of regulatory law which attempts to use legal norms to 
constitute structures, procedures and routines which are required to be adopted and 
internalised by regulated organisations, so that these structures, procedures and routines 
become part of the normal operating activities of the organisation.  
 
If breached, the OHS duties outlined above can be enforced ultimately by criminal 
prosecution. The OHS offences described above, however, differ from ‘typical’ crimes in 
that they are ‘inchoate’ offences, because they require no specific harm to be proven, but 
rather contemplate the possibility or risk of harm (Appleby, 20035).  An OHS prosecution, 
for example, need not be a response to an injury or fatality, but might be for a failure to 
provide a safe system of work, to conduct adequate hazard identification, risk assessment 
and control, or to guard a machine – even if no actual injury or fatality has resulted. This 
contrasts with traditional or typical criminal law that is more often concerned with outcomes 
                                                 
5  See also R v Australian Char Pty Ltd (1996) 64 IR 387 at 400 and Haynes v C I and D Manufacturing Pty Ltd (1995) 60 
IR 149 at 158 
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(for instance, actual bodily harm or death) than with modes of behaviour. The courts have 
made it clear that the primary purpose of the prosecution of OHS offences is deterrence – 
both general and specific – and, in some instances, corporate rehabilitation6. 
  
In contrast to the absolute or strict liability provisions in OHS statutes (discussed above), 
traditional criminal offences generally require mens rea or a ‘guilty mind’ in order to establish 
a criminal conviction. In order to be convicted of manslaughter for instance, it must be 
proven ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ not only that an individual both did a voluntary act or 
omitted to do something that caused the death of another, but also that they did so whilst 
possessing a guilty mind (Ashworth, 1999: 299-309). The guilty mind provides the measure 
of fault or moral culpability society has deemed proper for conviction of most traditional 
criminal offences.  
 
Different kinds of traditional criminal offences require different levels of fault or mens rea 
before a conviction can result. These levels of fault can be graded from most serious to less 
serious; the most culpable is an intention to do an act that is deemed criminal, followed by 
recklessness in doing such an act, and finally negligence in doing that act (Smith, 1999: 52-
96). The common law principles governing the level of culpability required for what is 
known as ‘involuntary manslaughter by gross negligence’ following an industrial death were 
explained by Hampel J in R v A C Hatrick Chemicals Pty Ltd, at pp 8-9:7 
 
‘The essence of manslaughter by criminal negligence is “a great falling short of the standard 
of care” which a reasonable person would have exercised, involving “such high risk that 
death or grievous bodily harm would follow that the doing of the act merited criminal 
punishment.”’8  
 
                                                 
6  See for example WorkCover Authority of NSW (Inspector Ankucic) v McDonald's Australia Limited and another (1999) 95 
IR 383 per Walton J at p 427; DPP v Ancon Travel Towers Pty Ltd, unreported, County Court of Victoria (Judge Mullaly), 16 
December, 1998; and R v AC Hatrick Chemicals Pty Ltd, unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Criminal Division (Hampel 
J), 8 December, 1995 at pp 5 and 6 
7  Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, 29 November 1995 
8  See also Nydam v R [1977] VR 430 at 445. The law of gross negligent manslaughter has been clarified in the 
United Kingdom by the case of R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171. This decision followed the decision of the Court 
of Appeal in R v Prentice and others [1994] 98 Cr App R 262 
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As we discuss below, the application of mens rea to industrial actors for ‘traditional’ criminal 
offences is however somewhat problematic.  
 
Involuntary manslaughter by gross negligence, therefore, is a crime quite different in nature 
from the OHS offences outlined above. Manslaughter is a response to a fatality – it is not an 
inchoate offence. The motivation for a manslaughter prosecution might be deterrence, but 
there are strong arguments that, unlike OHS prosecutions, manslaughter prosecutions might 
appropriately be motivated by retribution and/or denunciation (see Haines and Hall, 2004).  
 
What is important here is that mens rea and high levels of moral culpability are not deemed 
necessary for offences under the OHS statutes, for which industrial actors are most often 
prosecuted following industrial deaths. These offences are absolute or strict liability offences 
requiring only a criminal act in failing to safeguard the health and safety of an employee or 
member of the public and not an intention or other culpable mental state of mind to kill or 
harm such a person.  
 
Effective Regulation - Deterrence vs. Compliance And Punish vs. Persuade 
 
The OHS regulatory literature suggests that the criminal law (which is both ‘traditional’ and 
‘regulatory’ in nature) should be part of an OHS regulatory enforcement regime (see for 
instance Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999; Haines, 1997; 
Hopkins, 1995; Kagan and Scholz, 1984; Pearce and Tombs, 1990; Tombs and Whyte, 2003; 
and Johnstone, 2004b). Recent governmental policy initiatives also discuss increased use of 
criminal punishment in regulatory enforcement.9 How threat of prosecution should fit into 
general regulatory regimes and to what extent criminal law should be utilised in regulatory 
strategies is highly contentious however, as the longstanding ‘punish-persuade’ debate 
illustrates. 
 
                                                 
9  In particular in the regulation of health and safety at work, see recent policy publications contemplating the 
increased use of punishment in regulatory policy in the United Kingdom and Australia, such as Department for 
the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR)(2000); Home Office (2000); Health and Safety 
Commission (HSC)(2002); National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC)(2002); Victorian 
Workcover Authority (VWA)(2000); and VWA (2002) 
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On the one hand some argue that the primary focus of OHS enforcement should be on an 
‘advise and persuade’ approach, focusing on persuading those regulated to comply with 
regulations using methods like education and advice, autonomy of self-regulation, and 
‘diplomatic’ regulatory inspectors.10 When the regulated party defaults on obligations, the 
regulatory authorities should work with guilty parties to avoid recurrence but also to steer 
clear of too much blaming and shaming, so to keep avenues of co-operation open and 
effective. Proponents argue that this approach will best achieve desired effects of OHS 
regulation; that is prevention, through increasing OHS standards that should lead to a 
reduction in injuries and deaths to workers and members of the public. They also argue that 
such methods are not as resource intensive. The British Government has also argued that 
improvements in safety in turn will benefit the organisation economically (see for instance 
DETR, 1999).  
 
On the other hand, some argue the most successful means of regulation is to punish those 
regulated when they do not comply (Pearce and Tombs, 1990: Slapper and Tombs, 1999). 
Punishment should utilise criminal law (both traditional criminal law and OHS prosecutions) 
through a variety of more contemporary criminal sanctions all tailored to modern 
organisational actors (Cahill and Cahill, 1999; Gobert, 1998). By using punishment, messages 
are sent to others regulated that contraventions must be prevented or strong punishment will 
result. This has both moral and various deterrent effects. This approach suggests that only 
by threatening those regulated with criminal punishment can regulatory goals be achieved.  
 
More recently models have been developed to accommodate both ‘persuade’ and ‘punish’ 
strategies. The most well known of these is an escalating enforcement response using a 
regulatory enforcement pyramid (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Gunningham and Johnstone, 
1999; Haines, 1997; and Hopkins, 1995), where regulators start with a persuasion approach 
towards those regulated and escalate to punishment if they cannot be persuaded to comply. 
The type of organisational citizen the regulatory system is dealing with should have a large 
effect on responses to regulatory violations (Haines, 1997; and Gunningham and Johnstone, 
1999: chapter four). A gradual or incremental approach to enforcement can balance the need 
                                                 
10  The discussion of such approaches is common in any introductory regulatory literature, but in particular see 
Bardach and Kagan (1982) and Braithwaite (1985). See also Gunningham and Johnstone (1999: chapter four). 
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to be tough with the need to presume those regulated are ethical. This means establishing 
cooperation amongst those whose cooperation is needed and whose behaviour allows such 
an approach, whilst making all aware, cooperation is only one of a variety of methods that 
regulators can utilise. In the background, overshadowing all regulatory work is the severity of 
criminal law, targeting both individuals and corporations. One of the main criminal offences 
to be discussed in this paper, industrial manslaughter, would exist at the top of OHS 
enforcement pyramids (see, for example, Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999: chapters four, 
six and seven). 
 
Contemporary Issues Surrounding Accountability For Industrial Deaths 
 
The OHS regulatory debate canvassed in the previous section of this paper is not immune 
from perceptual and political changes within society and from unexpected and profound 
events and occurrences. The choice of regulatory strategy (whether to punish or persuade) is 
not insulated from public reaction to unexpected and profound events and occurrences 
(Hawkins, 2003). Since the 1980s in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom there have 
been a series of tragic and in particular well–publicised disasters resulting in the deaths of 
members of the public and workers.11 There have also been high profile workplace deaths, in 
particular of young workers killed on their first days at work.12 Some of these fatalities have 
been subject to wide ranging investigations and inquiries, and coroners, judges and 
politicians have lamented at the unnecessary and wasteful destruction of innocent human 
life. Coroners and judges have also eluded to what they view as the avoidable consequences 
of industrial activity; deaths and injuries that have resulted from management failures, 
systems breakdowns, and the neglect by organisations, their senior officers and workers to 
take health and safety as seriously as they should.13 
                                                 
11  Amongst the most often cited are the Zeebrugge ferry disaster (Wells, 2001: 107); the Piper Alpha Explosion 
(Lord Cullen, 1990); the Westray mining disaster (Justice Richard, 1997); and the Southall Rail Crash (Wells, 2001: 
112)  
12  In particular see the Simon Jones case in the United Kingdom (Brookes, 2002) and also see 
http://www.simonjones.org); the Anthony Carrick case in Victoria, Australia (see 
http://www.vthc.org.au/anthonycarrick/index.html.); and the Joel Exner case in New South Wales, Australia 
  ( http://www.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,4057,7682384%5E1702,00.html) 
13  See in particular Dawson and Brooks (1999); Fennell (1988); Hidden (1989); Lord Cullen (1990); Lord Cullen 
(2001); and Sheen Report (1987) 
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 This sense of despair felt by relatives and friends of those killed through industrial activity, 
by politicians, the judiciary, coroners, unions and employer organisations, and most 
importantly by the general public at large, has been heightened by the perception that the 
criminal justice system has failed to achieve justice for the dead and injured; to condemn 
organisational and individual health and safety failures; and allocate adequate resources to 
OHS. Rarely has anyone been held to accountable for such ‘crimes’ as industrial 
manslaughter following industrial deaths in public disasters. The Zeebrugge sinking, 
Clapham rail crash, Southall rail crash, Westray Mining explosion, Westgate Bridge collapse, 
and Esso Longford explosion are all etched in our minds as examples of the perceived 
failure of the criminal justice system to satisfy demands for accountability and retribution. 
Manslaughter prosecutions have rarely been brought in response to industrial deaths in 
public disasters, and if they have, they have spectacularly failed.14 What are often viewed as 
‘petty fines’ are all that result from the conviction (often following guilty pleas) of 
organisations (usually corporations) and their senior personnel where prosecutions have 
been taken for contraventions of OHS statutes following such industrial deaths.  
 
In addition to those killed in rare yet more widely publicised public disasters, regularly in 
excess of 200 people are fatally injured at work each year in the England and Wales (HSE, 
2003),15 perhaps over 400 per year in Australia (NOHSC, 2000),16 and perhaps as many as 
800 per year in Canada.17 These figures do not even attempt to capture all those whose 
deaths are related in some other way to employment. The number of those who die of 
occupational diseases contracted within the workplace or those killed in road traffic 
accidents whilst working are not included within such statistics (Slapper and Tombs, 1999: 
68-78). However there are just a handful of traditional criminal law convictions against 
organisations and their senior personnel each year following workplace deaths and very few 
                                                 
14  The most publicised recent example of a failed corporate manslaughter prosecution was at the trail of Great 
Western Trains following the Southall rail crash (see Wells, 2001: 112). This followed the failed corporate 
manslaughter prosecution against P&O ferries following the Zebrugge disaster in 1987 (see also Wells, 2001: 107-
111)  
15  This is a record low figure, but note that this is around a third of the number of work related fatal injuries 
recorded in 1981  
16  Note however that this is an estimate based on a number of work related death studies 
17  See http://www.clc-ctc.ca/health-safety/mourning.html. This figure is based on data from workers 
compensation boards 
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have ever occurred. There also seems to be irregular use of OHS prosecutions following 
workplace deaths (UNISON and CCA, 2002: 11-13; Perrone, 1995 and2000; Johnstone, 
2003). 
 
The need to act tough or perhaps be seen to act tough on the causes of industrial death has 
spurred a desire to reform existing OHS enforcement (particularly prosecutions) and 
traditional criminal law in this context. Victims groups have been formed, with some 
demanding criminal law reform and greater use of ‘traditional’ as opposed to ‘regulatory’ 
criminal law;18 advocacy centres now provide services to relatives of those killed through 
industrial deaths;19 unions have utilised their power and voice to condemn acts of ‘corporate 
killing’ and demand that OHS is taken more seriously;20 academics have condemned the 
inadequate response of the criminal justice system;21 and lawyers and barristers have argued 
in court for a wider interpretation of established criminal doctrines so as to extend the use of 
criminal law following industrial deaths.22 It seems fines are not enough, OHS prosecutions 
lack power and meaning (see Johnstone, 2003), and the traditional criminal law must be used 
more often and reformed in its response to industrial deaths.  
 
Which Existing Criminal Law Has Been Used Following Industrial Deaths?  
The discussion so far is not to suggest, however, that the traditional criminal law has never 
been prosecuted successfully against corporations and corporate personnel following 
industrial deaths.23  
 
                                                 
18  In particular in the United Kingdom: Disaster Action, the Herald Families Association, Safety on Trains Action 
Group, Marchioness Action and Marchioness Contact Groups, and the Simon Jones Memorial Campaign; and in 
Victoria, Australia: Industrial Death Support and Advocacy Group (IDSA) and the Uniting Church Partnership 
In Grieving Programme   
19  In particular the expanding Centre for Corporate Accountability in the United Kingdom 
20  In particular the Trades Union Congress, Transport and General Workers Union, and the Hazards Campaign in 
the United Kingdom (and in particular the Construction Safety Campaign of the 1980s) and the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions, the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union, and Victorian Trades Hall 
Congress in Australia  
21  In particular see Field and Jorg (1991), Fisse and Braithwaite (1993), Slapper (1999), and Wells (2001) 
22  See for instance Lissack QC (2000) 
23   It is important to stress here that the law up to the present time has generally only dealt with the criminal liability 
of the corporate entity, and hence the discussion in the first sections of this paper is very much focused on 
criminal liability of corporations for industrial deaths. However the proposals discussed in the later sections of 
this paper deal with ‘organisations’ or an ‘employer’ and hence the discussion about corporations should not be 
taken to apply exclusively just to corporations. 
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It was established in the legal disputes following the Zeebrugge disaster that there was no 
doubt a ‘corporation’ could be prosecuted for manslaughter in England and Wales following 
an industrial death that carried some level of moral culpability by some high ranking official 
of the company.24 The first conviction in the United Kingdom for the offence of corporate 
manslaughter followed in 1994 and a £65,000 fine was imposed; the death also resulted in 
the first custodial sentence (three years reduced to two on appeal) for a director of a 
company following an industrial death (Tombs, 1995: 351). So although manslaughter 
prosecutions have never resulted following public disasters, there has been limited success in 
prosecuting manslaughter in cases of workplace death in the United Kingdom. There have 
been five convictions for corporate manslaughter in England and Wales and one corporate 
homicide conviction in Scotland since 1994, and there have also been 12 convictions of 
company directors or business owners for manslaughter since 1989.25  
 
The first corporate manslaughter conviction in Australia was also in 1994,26 although the 
company went into liquidation and the $120, 000 fine was never paid (Coles, 1998). Since 
then there have been only a handful of prosecutions against corporations and corporate 
personnel, with Johnstone (1997: 424) reporting only two to have been successful. Victoria, 
the most proactive jurisdiction in Australia to prosecute for such offences, has had only 
three prosecutions.27 Research by Tucker (1995: 113-4) revealed that between 1900 and 1995 
there had been only eight criminal prosecutions of employers following workplace deaths in 
Canada and only one conviction for manslaughter which withstood appeal (for which the 
company was fined C$5000).  
 
There still seems however (despite legal developments) to be culpable conduct going 
unpunished. The litany of failed prosecutions referred to above provided evidence of 
management failures and organisational neglect which, although proving impossible to 
attribute to any individual, seems to point to some level of moral culpability on behalf of the 
                                                 
24  R v P&O Ferries (Dover) Limited (1991) 93 Cr App R 72. The first case of corporate manslaughter was brought in 
1927 (R v Cory Bros Ltd [1927] 1 KB 810) but was dismissed by the court; the possibility of a conviction of a 
corporation for an act of violence was rejected. 
25  See www.corporateaccountability.org/manslaughter.htm, as updated on 10th January 2004 
26  R v Denbo Pty Ltd., Victorian Supreme Court, 14th June 1994 
27  DPP v Dynamic Demolitions, Victorian Supreme Court, 8th December 1997; R v Denbo Pty Ltd., Victorian Supreme 
Court, 14th June 1994 (resulting in conviction); and  R v AC Hatrick Chemicals Pty Ltd, Victorian Supreme Court, 
29th November 1995 
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organisations involved following industrial deaths. Even when prosecutions have been 
successful against corporations and senior corporate personnel following an industrial death, 
such convictions concerned small companies with simple management structures where 
individual guilt was clearly visible and attributable to the company. Prosecutions against 
directors of larger corporations and the corporations themselves (or indeed other 
organisations including crown bodies) have never been successful in Australia, Canada or the 
United Kingdom.28 This begs the question as to whether it is really only small companies that 
are morally culpable following industrial deaths and injuries or whether the existing law is 
unable to capture the moral culpability of larger organisations and their senior personnel. 
 
Most of the well-known public disasters and industrial deaths in Australia, Canada and the 
United Kingdom that have not resulted in manslaughter convictions have not completely 
escaped criminal prosecution. Many large and small organisations and occasionally senior 
personnel have been convicted of OHS offences and fined.29 It is important to remember (as 
discussed in section eight) that these regulatory offences are part of the criminal law, albeit 
perhaps perceived as lesser than traditional criminal law (Carson and Johnstone, 1990). Great 
Western Trains were fined £1.5 million in England for failing in its general duty under 
section 3(1) of the Health and Safety at Work Act (HSWA) 1974 to ensure the safety of those 
not under its employment following the Southall rail disaster,30 whilst the Thames Train 
prosecution following the Paddington rail disaster broke this previously record fine, resulting 
in a £2 million fine against the company for failing in its duties under the HSWA 1974 to 
adequately train the train driver whom they employed and whose actions it was held 
contributed directly to the disaster.31 Esso Australia Pty Ltd. were also fined Aus$2 million in 
                                                 
28  Note however the ongoing cases relating to Network Rail and Balfour Beatty in relation to the Hatfield rail crash 
in October 2002 (Wells, 2003 and http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,998033,00.html) and 
relating to Barrow Borough Council in relation to an outbreak of legionnaires disease (Ward, 2004)  
29  Imprisonment against corporate personnel is a measure available only for an extremely limited number of 
offences under health and safety law. For instance, s37 Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (UK) states ‘Where an 
offence under any of the relevant provisions committed by a body corporate is proved to have been committed 
with the consent or connivance of, or to have been attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, 
manager, secretary or other similar office of the body corporate or a person who was purporting to act in any 
such capacity, he as well as the body corporate shall be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded 
against and punished accordingly. See also s52 Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985 (Vic.) These clauses only 
results in imprisonment where an individual can be proved to have for instance breached a prohibition order 
imposed by health and safety inspectors, a somewhat rarer and more deliberate act. For a full list of the offences 
that can result in imprisonment, see s33 (4) Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (UK) 
30  Attorney General’s Reference 2/99 [2000] 3 All ER 182.  
31  See http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,1186592,00.html 
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July 2001 following the Longford plant explosions, the largest ever fine in Australia for 
breach of OHS laws.32 However, the average level of fines for OHS prosecutions following 
industrial deaths, although increasing significantly in the England and Wales in recent years, 
remains low; also very few directors or senior managers of organisations are prosecuted 
and/or convicted under regulatory law (Unison and CCA, 2002; Johnstone, 2003). It seems 
that convictions under OHS law, however, may not satisfy society’s demands for a suitable 
level of accountability under ‘traditional’ as apposed to ‘regulatory’ criminal law following a 
preventable industrial death. 
 
The Criminal Law And Its Reform In Response To Indust ial Deaths r
                                                
 
Given the perceived deficiencies of existing criminal law (both traditional and regulatory) to 
provide suitable levels of organisational accountability following industrial deaths, reform 
has been proposed and pursued in the past decade. The rest of this paper highlights 
deficiencies in existing law that it has been argued contribute to a lack of criminal 
accountability both in the case of organisations in particular and of their senior personnel 
following industrial deaths. The reforms proposed both in Australia, Canada and England 
and Wales are then outlined and discussed, with attention paid to different legal doctrines 
battling for prominence in this area.  
 
In sections two to five of this paper, two themes are highlighted that consider ways to 
increase accountability following industrial deaths. Firstly, it seems there is a need for 
traditional criminal law (for instance manslaughter) to develop from its individualistic 
approach to criminal liability (the need for individual human mens rea before conviction can 
result) to a more contemporary approach that reflects organisational structures and 
organisational criminality; and looks at management decisions, organisational culture, 
systems failures and how these can lead to industrial death, and incorporating these sorts of 
ideas into criminal legal doctrine. Government proposals suggest that the regulatory criminal 
law (that is, prosecutions for contraventions of the OHS statutes) is not perceived as 
adequate on its own in response to some industrial deaths and therefore suggest a need for 
 
32  DPP v Esso Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 107 IR 285 
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traditional and more contemporary criminal offences to be prosecuted alongside OHS 
offences. Proposals have detailed the need for new rules in attributing criminal responsibility 
to organisational entities and new offences particularly drawn up to respond to industrial 
deaths. 
 
Secondly, it seems there is also the need for more individual criminal liability of 
organisational directors and/or senior personnel both through traditional criminal law and 
OHS offences following industrial deaths in which such individuals can be seen to have a 
level of culpability or blameworthiness in contributing to the events which led to the death. 
Proposals both by Governments, unions, pressure groups and victims groups have stressed 
that the importance of OHS should be reflected in duties imposed upon individual directors 
as well as on the organisations (which already universally occurs under existing OHS 
regulation). Also it has been suggested there is a need for new criminal offences to deal with 
senior personnel existing alongside wider use of existing OHS prosecutions (both through 
increased fines, more readily available prison options, and wider use of disqualification 
following breach of health and safety law). 
 
What most of the recent proposals discussed in this paper have suggested is the need for 
outcome-based prosecutions, i.e. offences that prosecute for the act of causing death or 
serious injury in the industrial context, as opposed to prosecutions for failing to act or 
breaching existing duties owed under OHS law. Although this approach, as we shall see, is 
not without its weaknesses (see section eight below), there seems to be a need to recognise 
organisational harm (in particular industrial deaths) as not just breach of a duty but as 
causing actual death. The proposals discussed in this paper suggest physical harm to workers 
and members of the public is serious and that OHS is about life and death. The proposals 
suggest OHS should perhaps not be the remit of only duty-based OHS law. 
 
Section six and seven shall then explore the issue of sanctions accompanying law reform, as 
in the organisational context this area has in general been neglected. It shall be suggested that 
there is the need to have both developed criminal accountability through law existing 
alongside the need for some originality in discussion of developing the sanctions framework 
to reflect the particular offender - that is, the need to have sanctions specific to 
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organisations, such as corporation probation, publicity orders, and fines linked to profits 
(equity fines), and to have sanctions specific to senior organisational personnel. This, it is 
argued, will maximise the effectiveness of the criminal law (both traditional and regulatory) 
in achieving its purposes following prosecution; purposes which must surely include 
rehabilitation, deterrence, and the improvement of OHS standards, beyond that of 
retribution. Symbolism of criminal prosecutions is perhaps not enough and sanctions should 
also look to achieve at the same time more utilitarian goals. The proposals for reform of 
organisational sanctions regimes will then be outlined. 
 
Section eight will address the issue of OHS reform as opposed to ‘traditional’ criminal law 
reform, and consider whether attention may have been wrongly shifted away from regulatory 
criminal law towards more traditional criminal law. It shall be suggested that such a shift 
could potentially deflect attention away from the importance and usefulness of existing OHS 
law that exists alongside traditional criminal law.  
 
Section nine considers the perhaps less evident and less talked about issues of investigation 
and enforcement of existing law, and developments relating to investigations of industrial 
deaths and enforcement of existing law shall be considered briefly. It shall be suggested that 
the issues of investigation, enforcement and prosecutorial discretion in applying the law 
needs to be considered, and that actual legal reform is just one part of the equation in 
increasing accountability following industrial deaths. Finally, section ten concludes with 
some initial reflections on the need for law reform, proposed law reforms, and the way 
forward from here.  
 
Legal reform seems to be required in the area of organisational criminal accountability for 
traditional criminal law offences, especially those involving industrial fatalities. As one 
barrister has suggested, ‘Whilst the law has developed significantly and in an enlightened 
fashion to enable corporations to be fixed with criminal liability in a whole range of other 
areas, the courts and Parliament [in the United Kingdom] have shown an astonishing 
unwillingness to ensure that the law keeps pace with increasingly sophisticated corporate 
structures when that corporation kills’ (Lissack QC, 2000).   
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Section Two 
Organisational Criminal Accountability: The Issues 
 
As the previous section has highlighted, there are perceived deficiencies in both traditional 
criminal law (in particular the law of manslaughter) and regulatory criminal law (OHS law) in 
achieving a suitable level of organisational criminal accountability following industrial deaths. 
 
The first theme that will be dealt with here is the perceived deficiencies in the way criminal 
liability is attributed to organisations (or more particularly the legal personality of the 
‘corporation’) following an industrial death; we shall look in particular at criminal liability for 
corporate manslaughter. The law of manslaughter that forms the basis of a prosecution for 
corporate manslaughter will be dealt with in section three on individual criminal liability, and 
here just the rules of attribution of criminal liability to corporations from the criminal 
liability of their personnel shall be explored. What difficulties arise in attributing criminal 
liability to a corporate personality? 
 
Here one must go back to the basics of criminal liability under criminal law systems 
throughout the world. Criminal liability stems from having both the actus reus and mens rea of 
a crime occurring at the same point in time (Smith and Hogan, 1999: chapter four). We dealt 
with mens rea in the introductory section of this paper, and this was taken to mean that there 
must be a guilty mind that reflects a level of moral culpability. The actus reus of a crime 
meanwhile is the criminal act, that is, a voluntary act or omission that caused for instance 
death. Whilst the actus reus of a criminal offence arguably gives rise to fewer complications 
when applying criminal law to corporations, the mens rea is far more troublesome.  
 
Criminal law has evolved around the central theme of individual liability, and so takes an 
individualistic approach to the elements of any crime (Wells, 2001: 1). For this reason the 
question that needs to be asked in relation to corporations is how to attribute blame, moral 
culpability, or mens rea, to the corporate personality in order to have both elements (the actus 
reus and mens rea) to convict it of a criminal offence. How can an organisation be immoral, 
and what is organisational blameworthiness? As has been stated in numerous appellate 
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judgements, one must bear in mind that ‘A corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind of 
its own any more than it has a body of its own.’33 Though the problem of attributing criminal 
liability to the corporate personality has taken time to overcome, the law has found logical 
answers and the hurdle has by no means been insurmountable. 
 
This paper shall consider a number of principles adopted by courts and legislatures in 
Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom to establish corporate criminal liability and to 
attribute criminal guilt (in particular the guilty mind or mens rea) to the corporate entity. 
These include the personal liability doctrine, the identification doctrine and the aggregation 
principle. The ‘corporate culture’ provisions in Australian Commonwealth law will be dealt 
with in section four of this paper. 
 
This section will focus primarily on the second of these modes of attribution, the 
identification doctrine, which the courts have applied to issues of corporate mens rea in gross 
negligent manslaughter cases. However it is necessary to understand and evaluate all the 
routes to organisational criminal liability in order to assess the proposed reforms to existing 
law that this paper shall discuss in section four. 
 
The Personal Liability Doctrine 
 
We begin with a brief discussion of the personal liability doctrine. Here, criminal liability is 
placed upon the corporation personally following the commission of an offence. Although 
widely used in United States federal law (Wells, 2001: 85), in Australia, Canada and the 
United Kingdom use of this form of criminal liability usually arises only when the intention 
of the law clearly indicates that the offence in question is one that does not require mens rea 
or a guilty mind, with such not being the case for instance with the offence of manslaughter.  
 
                                                 
33  Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 705 
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The personal liability doctrine is, however, used in OHS law. Specific duties are owed by 
organisations themselves,34 and breach of one of these duties entails the automatic criminal 
liability of the organisation whether or not harm results. The duty is absolute, personal and 
non-delegable, and the effect is that the organisation is liable for any acts or omissions of 
those who are in a relationship to it (its workers, subcontractors etc.) that breach OHS 
statutory duties subject only to the defence that it did all that was ‘practicable’ or ‘reasonably 
practicable’ to prevent the commission of the offence.35 So when the duties under the 
various OHS statutes are breached, whether or not this results in harm, there is no need to 
try and attribute to the organisation another’s guilty mind or mens rea. The identification 
doctrine does not apply to OHS statutes.36 The offence is personal to the organisation and 
requires no measure of mens rea (Gobert and Punch, 2003: 55-59). In the words of Tipping J 
in the New Zealand Court of Appeal,37 this 
 
‘analysis does not depend on [the foreman’s] status within the employer company, nor upon 
concepts of agency or vicarious liability. It relies simply upon the proposition that once there 
has been a failure to take a practicable step to ensure the employee's safety, the employer is 
responsible for that failure.’ 
 
The upshot of these cases is that a corporation will not be absolved from liability simply 
because at a top management level the company had taken all reasonable steps to ensure 
safety, if at an operational level it was the court’s opinion based on the facts that such steps 
as were ‘reasonably practicable’ had not been taken to implement OHS policies and 
procedures. Wells (2001: 102) suggests that ‘the company … falls to be judged not on its 
words but its actions, including the actions of its employees.’ 
                                                 
34  For a discussion of the Australian duties, see Johnstone (2004; chapters four to six) The equivalent United 
Kingdom provisions are to be found in  ss2-6 Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (UK)  
35  See for instance Linework Limited v Department of Labour [2001] 2 NZLR 639, R v British Steel Plc [1995] 1 WLR 
1356, R v Associated Octel Co Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 846, R v Gateway Foodmarkets Ltd [1997] 3 All ER 78 in the United 
Kingdom. See also WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Lacey) v George Weston Foods Ltd, unreported, 
Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales in Court Session (Maidment J), 26 March, 1999; WorkCover 
Authority of New South Wales (Inspector McKenzie) v Waste Recycling & Processing Services of New South Wales, unreported, 
[2000] NSWIRComm 218; WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Carmody) v Byrne Civil Engineering 
Constructions Pty Ltd (No 1) (2001) 103 IR 80; WorkCover Authority of New South Wales v Siemens Pty Ltd (formerly 
Mannesman Dematic Colby Pty Ltd) No 2 [2003] NSWIRComm 45 at para 42; WorkCover Authority of New South Wales 
(Inspector Yeung) v Thiess Pty Ltd [2003] NSWIRComm 325 at para 37; and Thompson (2001: 27) 
36    See, in particular, Linework Limited v Department of Labour [2001] 2 NZLR 639, R v British Steel Plc [1995] 1 WLR 
1356, R v Associated Octel Co Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 846 and R v Gateway Foodmarkets Ltd [1997] 3 All ER 78. 
37    Linework Limited v Department of Labour [2001] 2 NZLR 639 at para [45]. 
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The Identification Doctrine 
 
In contrast to the personal liability approach which is used for offences (including OHS 
offences) which do not require mens rea, the narrower identification doctrine has been used in 
Australia, Canada and the England and Wales to attribute to the ‘corporation’ mens rea or the 
guilty mind when this was required for the commission of a criminal offence. Corporations 
are artificial legal personalities and can only act through their human employees and agents; 
yet they are also legal ‘fictions’ created by company law to be distinct from their directors, 
workers and shareholders.38 Therefore in order for the mens rea that is the requisite for 
traditional criminal offences to be attributed to the corporation, the courts from the 1940s 
onwards39 developed rules to use the individual knowledge, intention or actions of particular 
employees and to say that such knowledge is that of the corporation itself. Particular agents 
of the corporation are the corporation. The law therefore developed to attach criminal 
liability theoretically to the corporation through requiring evidence of mens rea usually against 
a senior officer of a corporation during their acting as a ‘directing mind and will’ of that 
corporation (Gobert and Punch, 2003: 59-69).  
 
This ‘identification’ doctrine was authoritatively laid down in Tesco v Nattrass40 although Lord 
Denning’s judgement in H. L. Bolton (Engineering) Co. Ltd. v T. J. Graham & Son Ltd41 outlines 
the principle most clearly:  
 
‘A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a brain and nerve centre 
which controls what it does. It also has hands which hold the tools and act in accordance 
with directions from the centre. Some of the people in the company are mere servants and 
agents who are nothing more than hands to do the work and cannot be said to represent the 
mind or will. Others are directors and managers who represent the directing mind and will of 
the company, and control what it does. The state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of the 
company and is treated by the law as such [our emphasis]… in the criminal law, in cases where the 
law requires a guilty mind as a condition of a criminal offence, the guilty mind of the 
directors or the managers will render the company itself guilty.’42 
 
 
                                                 
38  See Salomon v Salomon [1897] A.C. 22 
39  It was the trio of cases decided in the 1940s that greatly developed the way mens rea was attributed to corporations 
(Wells, 2001: 93; and Slapper and Tombs, 1999: 28) 
40  [1972] 2 WLR 1166 
41  [1957] 1 QB 159 
42  Ibid. at pg. 172.  
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The identification doctrine has been the relevant legal test applied in deciding whether a 
corporation should be prosecuted for the crime of manslaughter. Was there evidence of 
manslaughter carried out by an individual who could be identified as the ‘directing mind and 
will’ of the corporation?43  
 
The most obvious question to ask in relation to the identification doctrine is how far it 
extends?  Exactly which company officers come within the definition of the ‘directing mind 
and will’ of a corporation to establish corporate criminal liability? Whose acts can be 
classified in law as those of the corporation? It is here that the limitations to the doctrine can 
be found (Forlin, 2004).  
 
Courts in Australia and the England and Wales have generally taken a very narrow, and 
arguably unrealistic, approach in answering this question. They have laid down that it is 
generally only the board of directors, the managing director(s), senior and highly placed 
managers or anyone to whom a function of the board had been fully delegated that can be 
seen in law as the ‘directing mind and will’ of the corporation.44 As Wells notes, ‘The 
relatively narrow doctrine (identification) … had as its governing principle that only those 
who control or manage the affairs of a company are regarded as embodying the company 
itself’ (Wells, 2001: 101). 
 
However, the Canadian courts have defined the ‘directing mind and will’ concept more 
broadly than their Australian and British counterparts (see in particular Ferguson, 1999). In 
Canadian Dredge and Dock,45  Estey J outlined the principle as follows: 
 
‘The essence of the test [the directing mind and will test] is that the identity of the directing 
mind and the company coincide so long as the actions of the former are performed by the 
manager within the sector of corporate operations assigned to him by the corporation [our emphasis]. The 
sector may be functional, or geographic, or may embrace the entire undertaking of the 
corporation. The requirement is better stated when it is said that the act in question must be 
                                                 
43   To this we shall return in section three below. 
44  See for instance Tesco v Natrass [1972] 2 WLR 1166, in particular the judgements of Lord Pearson at p 1196. See 
also R v AC Hatrick Chemicals Pty Ltd., unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, 29th November 1995 and Hamilton 
v Whitehead (1988) 82 ALR 626 
45  [1985] 1 SCR. 662 
 
 
24
done by the directing force of the company when carrying out his assigned function in the 
corporation.’46 
 
Eskey J continues: 
 
‘… the identification doctrine only operates where the crown demonstrates that the action 
taken by the directing mind (a) was within the field of operation assigned to him; (b) was not 
totally in fraud of the corporation; and (c) was by design or result partly for the benefit of 
the company.’47   
 
This test was defined further in The Rhone v The Peter A.B. Widener,48 where Iacobucci J stated 
that: 
 
‘One must determine whether the discretion conferred on an employee amounts to an 
express or implied delegation of executive authority to design and supervise the 
implementation of corporate policy rather than simply to carry out such a policy… the court 
must consider who has been left with the decision-making power in a relevant sphere of 
corporate activity.’49 
 
A recent Scottish case, while appearing to extend the Tesco identification doctrine, shows 
how narrow its application is in practice. In Transco PLC v Her Majesty’s Advocate,50 Scotland's 
Court of Criminal Appeal ruled for the first time that Scottish corporations can be 
prosecuted for the offence of ‘culpable homicide’ (similar, but not identical, to the Australian 
crime of manslaughter by gross negligence) after four members of the public were killed in a 
gas explosion. The court held that the Tesco identification doctrine applied in Scottish law. 
Lord Hamilton (with whom Lord MacLean agreed) was of the opinion that the ‘directing 
mind and will’ of the company could include both an individual to whom powers and 
responsibilities were delegated, and also a group of persons, such as a committee of 
directors, whose delegated powers are to be exercised on a collective basis.  The court, 
however, rejected the argument that the prosecutor could rely on the ‘accumulated states of 
knowledge and awareness of all those hitherto having and exercising the directing mind and 
will.’ In other words, the requisite knowledge or intention had to be held by the group to 
                                                 
46  Ibid. at p 685  
47  Ibid. at pp 713-4 
48  [1993] 1 SCR. 497 
49  Ibid. at p 521  
50  Appeal No: XC392/03, 3 June 2003 
The judgement is online at http://www.corporateaccountability.org/dl/Cases/transcoapp.doc. 
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whom powers and responsibilities were delegated at the time the offence took place – and 
the court could not look to knowledge and intention of previous members of the group.  
 
In legal disputes following industrial deaths, the problems that such narrow ‘identification’ 
tests gave rise to in terms of failing to achieve adequate corporate criminal accountability are 
obvious (see further Fisse, 1994). It may often be the case, especially in larger and more 
complex organisations such as corporations, that those seemingly more culpable when an 
industrial death takes place are those working on the front line; for instance, train drivers 
passing signals at speed or individuals working on the ground with dangerous equipment and 
in dangerous situations. Although these individuals can be liable in their own right for 
criminal offences, they cannot be described as the ‘directing mind and will’ of a corporation 
so as to establish corporate criminal liability. These individuals often do not work at a policy 
level or deal with implementing policy (in particular OHS policy), but simply do what they 
have been trained to do. It is therefore often very hard to link an industrial death to an 
individual who falls within the ‘directing mind and will test.’ The evidential requirements to 
prove that a particular policy at management or director level caused the death or injury of a 
worker can often be impossible to overcome (see for instance Appleby, 2003; Forlin and 
Appleby, 2004; and Forlin, 2004). For this reason it has often proved impossible to convict 
all but the smallest and structurally and organisationally simplest industrial actors for 
corporate manslaughter.        
 
The Aggregation Principle 
 
In accepting the identification doctrine, the courts have rejected what is known as the 
‘aggregation’ principle for attributing criminal liability to corporations (Gobert and Punch, 
2003: 82-86; Wells, 2001: 109). According to this principle, the fault of a number of different 
and perhaps unrelated individuals (workers, contractors or senior officers) can be aggregated 
to form the guilt of the corporation. As long as the corporation ‘as a whole’ is morally 
culpable for a criminal offence, the aggregation principle could be used to establish its 
criminal liability. The British Court of Appeal confirmed the rejection of this aggregation 
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principle in the case stemming from the Southall rail crash, with Rose LJ referring to the 
judgement of Bingham J in R v HM Coroner for East Sussex ex. parte Rohan where he stated: 
 
‘A case against a personal defendant cannot be fortified by evidence against another 
defendant. The case against a corporation can only be made by evidence properly addressed 
to showing guilt on the part of the corporation as such.’51 
 
The aggregation principle has been seen by the judiciary as contrary to interests of justice; it 
supplies guilt on behalf of a corporation where in fact there was not guilt on behalf of an 
individual or individuals who could satisfy the ‘directing mind and will’ test of corporate 
criminal liability for offences such as corporate manslaughter.  
 
The Identification Doctrine Reconsidered? 
 
As we noted earlier, one must also distinguish the identification doctrine strictly applied 
from more recent decisions of the judiciary in cases concerned less with traditional criminal 
law offences and more with absolute or strict liability offences. One such case is R v British 
Steel52 which, together with a series of other English cases, established that the Tesco 
identification principle does not apply to absolute liability OHS general duty offences. The 
liability of duty holders for contravention of the general duty provisions in the OHS statutes 
are personal and non-delegable. In effect, an organisation is liable for any of the acts or 
omissions of its workers or contractors which put others at risk.53  
 
Also of importance is the case of Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities 
Commission.54 In addition to the decisions of the courts not to apply the identification 
                                                 
51  (1987) 88 Cr App R 10, at pgs. 16-17, cited from Attorney General’s Reference (no. 2 of 1999) [2000] 3 All ER 182 at  
190 
52  [1995] 1 WLR 1356 
53  R v British Steel plc [1995] 1 WLR 1356, R v Associated Octel Co Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 846 and R v Gateway Foodmarkets 
Ltd [1997] 3 All ER 78. The United Kingdom courts appear to have, however, left open the possibility that an 
employer which has otherwise exercised all proper precautions might not be liable for casual negligence on the 
part of low level employees or of contractors, where the company had adequately supervised the employees or 
contractors. This is not a new principle, but an application of the practicability qualification: see R v Nelson Group 
Services Ltd (Maintenance) [1998] 4 All ER 331. See also Johnstone (1999), Johnstone (2004: 229-242) and Linework 
Limited v Department of Labour [2001] 2 NZLR 639. 
54  [1995] 2 AC 500 
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doctrine to OHS offences, there have been successful judicial attempts to widen the 
identification doctrine so that it includes more individuals within a company, and more 
importantly, reflect the more modern organisational structure of corporations. This attempt 
has its routes in the speech of Lord Hoffmann in Meridian, which addressed the issue of 
whether the knowledge of two individual employees could be attributed to the company so 
as to attach liability to the company for the breach of the Securities Amendment Act 1988. 
 
Lord Hoffmann relied on the purposive construction of the statute in question to make his 
decision, but in doing so, managed to distinguish the principle to be applied in this case from 
the stricter identification principle as applied in Tesco and also perhaps to expand on that 
principle. Lord Hoffmann suggested: 
‘It is a necessary part of corporate personality that there should be rules by which acts are 
attributed to the company… these may be called “the rules of attribution”… The company’s 
primary rules of attribution will generally be found in its constitution, typically the articles of 
association… These primary rules are obviously not enough to enable a company to go out 
into the world and do business… The company therefore builds upon the primary rules of 
attribution by using general rules of attribution that are equally available to natural persons, 
namely principles of agency. It will appoint servants and agents whose acts, by a 
combination of the general principles of agency and the company’s primary rules of 
attribution, count as the acts of the company, and having done so, it will also make itself 
subject to the general rules by which liability for the acts of others can be attributed to 
natural persons, such as estoppel or ostensible authority in contract and vicarious liability in 
tort… The company’s general rules of attribution together with the general principles of 
agency, vicarious liability and so forth are usually sufficient to enable one to determine its 
rights and obligations… In exceptional cases however, they will not provide an answer… 
This is generally true of rules of criminal law, which ordinarily impose liability only for the 
actus reus and mens rea of the defendant himself. How is such a rule to be applied to the 
company?’55  
 
Lord Hoffmann went on to say: 
 
‘One possibility is that the court may come to the conclusion that the rule was not intended 
to apply to companies at all [for example murder, which as it is defined only provides the 
possibility of imprisonment as a sanction, and so could not apply to the corporate 
personality]… Another possibility is that the court might interpret the law as meaning that it 
could apply to the company on the basis of its primary rules of attribution… But [our 
emphasis] there will be many cases in which neither of these solutions is satisfactory; in which the court 
considers that the law was intended to apply to companies and that, although it [the law] excludes ordinary 
vicarious liability, insistence on the primary rules of attribution [as in Tesco v Nattrass] would in practice 
defeat the intention. In such a case, the court must fashion a special rule of attribution for the particular 
substantive rule. This is always a matter of interpretation; given that it was intended to apply to the company, 
                                                 
55  Ibid. at pp. 506 -507 
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how should it apply? Whose acts (or knowledge, or state of mind) was “for this purpose” intended to count as 
the act etc. of the company? One finds the answer to this question by applying the usual canons of 
interpretation, taking into account the language of the rule (if it is a statute) and its content and policy.’ 56 
 
Lord Hoffmann here takes the main issue to be ‘one of construction rather than 
metaphysics… It is a question of construction in each case as to whether the particular rule 
requires that the knowledge that an act has been done, or so the state of mind with which it 
should be done, should be attributable to the company…’57 He is suggesting that rather than 
considering who it is that should be considered as the ‘directing mind’ of the company, it is 
more important to look at whose behaviour and actions Parliament intended to be 
attributable to the company. Whether or not this should have been the approach taken in 
Tesco v Nattrass, it appears that Lord Hoffmann expresses no reservations that the decision in 
that case was correct as to the facts, but was in this case distinguishable. 
 
Meridian allows liability to be attached to a company by extending the ambit of those whose 
acts the company can be attributable outside those ‘senior management’ members. As Wells 
(2001: 104) observes, ‘It seemed clear that Meridian, in acknowledging the need for a more 
sensitive test of corporate attribution, was stretching the identification model, rather than 
taking the offence into the vicarious liability category… In the age of flatter corporate 
hierarchies, “empowered” front-line employees and devolved decision-making, Lord 
Hoffmann’s decision has considerable resonance in the real commercial world.’ Wells 
reminds us, however, that this approach was firmly rejected in the Great Western Trains case 
following the Southall rail crash in England,58 yet it is important to understand the Meridian 
principle as one competing on the legal stage in regard criminal corporate responsibility in 
Australia, Canada and England and Wales, and that cases discussed above which have 
determined that the identification doctrine does not apply to OHS offences are, in effect, an 
application of Lord Hoffmann’s thinking on Meridian.59 
 
                                                 
56  Ibid. 
57  Ibid. at p 511 
58  See the argument of Lissack QC (2000) 
59  This is explained in Linework Limited v Department of Labour [2001] 2 NZLR 639. 
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Conclusions 
 
The deficiencies in the identification doctrine, as applied to traditional criminal offences such 
as manslaughter, has inspired judges (see again Lord Hoffmann in the Meridian case) and 
legislative reformers (in Australia, Canada and the England and Wales) to develop new 
attribution principles in order to ensure that prosecutions can be brought more often and 
more successfully following industrial deaths. In order to understand how the identification 
doctrine has worked in practice however, the next section of the paper considers the 
requirements for individual guilt in the case of manslaughter and other traditional crimes. It 
has been this level of individual guilt that provided the moral culpability required for the 
identification doctrine, and it has been with the individual identifying mind that a corporate 
prosecution under traditional criminal laws such as corporate manslaughter falls to be 
judged. 
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Section Three 
Individual Criminal Accountability: The Issues 
 
In section two we outlined the common law rules for manslaughter by gross negligence, and 
explained that the issue of corporate criminal liability for traditional criminal offences 
relating to industrial death has always been dependent upon individual criminal liability. The 
basis of the identification doctrine has been individual criminal liability, and the only way in 
which a corporation could be found liable itself has been through actions of a select group of 
its senior personnel. Finding the individual liability of a directing mind, beyond that of 
identifying a directing mind in the first place, has caused many of the problems with the 
issue of corporate criminal accountability (Forlin, 2004). 
 
Under the proposed reforms to the law relating to organisational criminal accountability, it 
seems that there would be vastly different approaches to the issues of organisational and 
individual accountability for traditional criminal law. Therefore in this section we lay out 
proposed manslaughter rules as they relate to individuals, and in section four we consider the 
proposals for manslaughter for organisations. It may be that the future sees a clear 
distinction between individual and organisational, whereas the past has relied on the two 
being linked together with organisational accountability  dependent upon individual liability. 
 
Prosecuting Gross Negligent Manslaughter 
 
Gross negligent manslaughter, which we discussed in section one above, is the form of 
manslaughter presently relied on when prosecuting corporate manslaughter following an 
industrial death. Gross negligent manslaughter bases criminal liability on a negligence 
standard, in contrast with the requirement that criminal intent (or perhaps recklessness) must 
be proven at trial for other homicide offences in Australia, Canada and the England and 
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Wales.60 Gross negligent manslaughter is therefore a rare criminal offence in that liability is 
based on an objective culpability (that is, negligence) on behalf of a defendant as opposed to 
subjective culpability. This difference in the evidential standard is significant as negligence 
(as discussed above in section one) is the least demanding form of mens rea used in criminal 
law, in contrast to the requirement to prove the more serious intention or recklessness tests. 
Negligence allows a conviction based on what the defendant should have known or ought to 
have done in contrast to the requirement to prosecute for what they in fact knew or did.  
 
An individual can be convicted of gross negligent manslaughter if they acted or failed to act in 
a grossly negligent manner. With industrial deaths, the cause of death has almost always been 
failure to act through failing to ensure safe workplace procedures and practices or failing to 
protect the public from harm. In order to be convicted of gross negligent manslaughter 
through a failure to act, a duty of care on behalf of the defendant to the deceased must be 
proven and breached. The breach of duty must be a substantial cause of death and a jury 
itself will have to decide whether ‘the extent to which the defendant’s conduct departed 
from the proper standard of care incumbent upon him … was such that it should be judged 
criminal.’61 This individual liability for manslaughter would then, if that individual was 
classified as a ‘directing mind and will’ of a corporation, feed into the offence of corporate 
manslaughter through application of the identification doctrine. 
 
This duty of care requirement when prosecuting corporate manslaughter creates problems as 
it is employers (i.e. the organisation) themselves that owe the duty of care to protect the health 
and safety of the public and their workers. Breach of this duty entails liability under OHS 
legislation.62 However, directors of corporations themselves generally owe duties to the 
company and to shareholders, and rarely owe a direct duty of care to workers or members of 
                                                 
60  See R v Maloney [1985] A.C. 905. For more detailed discussion, see Ashworth (1999: chapter seven) and Smith 
(1999: chapter twelve). Note however the law in Victoria which is slightly different in utilizing the concept of 
reckless murder and constructive murder, potentially making the offence easier to prove than an offence 
definition based solely on intention. See Rush (1997: chapter nine) 
61  This definition was based on Lord Hewart CJ’s judgement in R v Bateman [1925] All ER 79. I shall not expand 
here on how gross negligence is actually proven at trial for it is a subject of much debate and there are a number 
of conflicting viewpoints. The law’s application by the Crown Prosecution Services in the United Kingdom 
(where it has been tested more widely than any other jurisdiction) following industrial deaths has been disputed, 
successfully judicially reviewed, and subject to much academic discussion. See however Tombs and Whyte (2003: 
2-3) for a brief discussion or for more technical discussion see Appleby (2003) and Lissack QC (2000) 
62  See the discussion of the general duty provisions in Johnstone (2004: chapters four and five).  
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the public to safeguard their lives and well-being.63 As we noted above, it is only through the 
criminal acts of directors as the ‘directing mind’ of the corporation that criminal 
responsibility can be attributed to the corporation through the identification doctrine.  
 
It will only be on rare occasions that a court will be able to find a duty of care owed by an 
individual which can form the basis of a gross negligent manslaughter prosecution following 
an industrial death, and might also result in the conviction of a company for corporate 
manslaughter. One example occurred in the Victorian case R v Denbo Pty Ltd and Another,64 
where the company entered a guilty plea to avoid the prosecution of individual personnel for 
manslaughter. A second example is where the ‘directing mind’ of the company owes a duty 
of care under OHS legislation as the company itself. This seems the case only in small 
companies with perhaps one or two directors who are both the ‘hands’ and ‘mind’ of the 
company. A third example arises in cases where a court accepts the ‘directing mind and will’ 
of a larger company satisfied the gross negligence test through having a duty of care to act 
towards the deceased, potentially through personally ‘procuring, directing, or authorising’ the 
company to commit the unlawful act that caused death, or if the ‘directing mind and will’ 
acted towards the deceased in a way that they assumed personal responsibility towards them 
to create a ‘special relationship’ (CCA, 2000: 3.27)65.  
 
This kind of duty of care and such knowledge has never been proven against a ‘directing 
mind and will’ of a larger company in the Australia, Canada or the United Kingdom.66 
 
                                                 
63  For further discussion see Farrar and Hannigan (1998: chapter 24) and Malcome (1997)  
64  Supreme Court of Victoria, 14th June 1994. The Director of Public Prosecutions accepted a guilty plea to 
corporate manslaughter in exchange for dropping of charges of manslaughter against an individual director, who 
was instead prosecuted under the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985 (Vic). See Chesterman (1994) 
65  It was suggested by a solicitor in one of the author’s PhD interviews in July 2003 that it could be argued that a 
director owes the duty to adhere to the duty of care under health and safety legislation and to put systems in place 
to ensure compliance with the law under the Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (UK). See also Parker and 
Conolly (2002)  
66  Note however the ongoing cases relating to Network Rail and Balfour Beatty in relation to the Hatfield rail crash 
in October 2002 (Wells, 2003 and http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,998033,00.html) and 
relating to Barrow borough council in relation to an outbreak of legionnaires disease (Ward, 2004)  
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Success And Failure In Prosecuting Corporate Manslaughter Through Gross 
Negligent Manslaughter 
The first conviction for corporate manslaughter in England and Wales concerned a company 
with one director who became the first director to be given a custodial sentence when 
convicted of manslaughter.67 Similar circumstances existed in more recent convictions in  
England and Wales and the first conviction of a company in Victoria, Australia.68 However 
there have also been two high-profile failed attempts to prosecute larger companies in 
England and Wales for corporate manslaughter following public disasters. These were: the 
failed prosecution against P&O ferry company after the Zeebrugge tragedy, despite findings 
by an independent inquiry that ‘from top to bottom the body corporate was infected with 
the disease of sloppiness’ (Wells, 2001: 109); and the failed prosecution against Great 
Western Trains following the Southall rail crash, where a high-speed commuter train went 
through a red light in London and hit a goods unit, resulting in seven deaths and the injury 
of 151 (Wells, 2001: 109-111). Evidence disclosed at trial suggested the company encouraged 
drivers to depart on time even if train safety systems were not working.69  
 
Both of these trials failed because no evidence of gross negligent manslaughter was 
presented at trial against individuals who could be identified as the ‘directing mind and will’ 
of the corporation. Due to public disquiet following the failed prosecution in the Southall 
train disaster, the Attorney General referred the question of corporate manslaughter to the 
Court of Appeal as an issue of public importance that required clarification. The court held 
the identification doctrine remained the only basis for attributing criminal liability for 
manslaughter to corporations under English law .70 The court suggested reform of corporate 
manslaughter law was for the British Government, pointing out the Government was already 
                                                 
67  R v Kite and others, Independent, 9th December 1994. See Slapper and Tombs (1999: 33 – 34) for further discussion. 
The directors guilt however was very clear and the company very small, and so the director was in fact and in law 
the actual company 
68  In the United Kingdom see R v Jackson Transport (Ossett) Ltd, Health and Safety at Work, November 1996, the more 
recent R v Teglgaard Hardwood UK Ltd and another, Yorkshire Post, 28th February 2003, and TUC (2003: 
Appendix). In Victoria see R v Denbo Pty Ltd and another, Victorian Supreme Court, 14th June 1994. For further 
discussion of the corporate manslaughter situation in Victoria, see Corns (1991). See also Johnstone (2004: 466 
and 475). 
69  The commuter train had been fitted with a protection system that had been promised after earlier rail incidents 
but the driver had not been trained to use it. The safety system that the train had installed had not been working 
properly. Great Western Trains pleaded guilty to their general duty under s 3 (1) Health and Safety at Work Act 
1974 (UK) and were fined a record £1.5 million (Wells, 2001: 109-111) 
70  Attorney General’s Reference (no. 2 of 1999) [2000] 3 All ER 182 
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considering proposals to reform the law.71 The authoritative Court of Appeal judgement also 
rejected the argument that the company’s duty of care could form the duty of care needed 
under gross negligent manslaughter (see also Lissack QC, 2000). It was held that the duty of 
care required under gross negligent manslaughter is that of an individual and not the 
company, with that individual then potentially being identified with the company through 
the identification doctrine.  
 
These failed corporate manslaughter prosecutions are examples of a litany of failures to 
prosecute successfully (and more importantly to even prosecute) using manslaughter law 
following industrial deaths, and have indicated to some that corporate actors are immune to 
or above criminal law. The issues of the inadequacy of present law stems from the 
identification doctrine and its practical application following industrial deaths. These failed 
convictions and the failure to prosecute are widely discussed in academic literature and form 
the basis of many calls for corporate manslaughter law reform. Without the duty of care on 
behalf of the directing mind of a corporation the prosecution of any individual for gross 
negligent manslaughter and for this reason also the company for corporate manslaughter 
collapses.  
 
Showing that something done in the boardroom is a cause of death (a key element of gross 
negligent manslaughter prosecutions) is also not particularly easy either, even though the 
criminal law has clearly developed on the issue of causation. A related point is that it is also 
difficult to establish that acts of directing minds are a ‘substantial’ cause of death (Appleby, 
2003). At present it seems the courts are willing to look beyond the immediate cause of 
death (perhaps a mistake by an employee) towards a more systems-based approach. Would 
the event which caused the industrial fatality have happened if there had been a system in 
place? If not, was the failure to put a system in place criminal? If so, then who is it that 
should put this system in place? These questions could potentially lead back to a director or 
directing mind of a company thus establishing the line of causation between a director and 
                                                 
71  Ibid. at p 192 
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the deceased. By failing to put a system in place to prevent the death, the senior office could 
be said to have caused the death.72 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has so far identified the problems in prosecuting corporations and individual 
corporate personnel following industrial death, which in turn led back to both (i) the 
problem with using the identification doctrine to attribute criminal accountability to 
corporations and (ii) the actual make up of individual criminal offences and the difficulty of 
proving that senior personnel of corporations owed a duty of care to the deceased. Recent 
reform proposals (one of which has been implemented) seek to overcome these problems. 
In the next section we consider these proposals, and explain the varied approaches different 
jurisdictions have taken to the problem of the law’s response to industrial death.    
                                                 
72  See for instance the related discussion in Parker and Conolly (2002) 
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Section Four  
Reform In The Criminal Law’s Response to Industrial Deaths: Organisations - 
Where Are We Now? 
 
In recent years proposals have been put forward in Australia and Canada to reform in general 
the methods for attributing criminal liability to organisations. The proposals either do away 
with the identification doctrine for attributing criminal liability to organisations or extend the 
doctrines ambit to cover more individuals within an organisation who could then be 
classified as its ‘directing mind and will’ or as ‘senior officers’. These proposals tend to adopt 
some form of the aggregation principle outlined in section two. Such reforms could 
potentially cover both prosecutions following industrial deaths and injuries and all other 
kinds of criminal organisational activities. The reforms provide evidence of a shift away from 
wholly individual notions of criminal liability to more collective notions; and seek to 
attribute organisational corporate criminal responsibility based on systems failures, 
organisational cultures, and management failures.  
 
Proposals have also been put forward in Australia and England and Wales to deal specifically 
with the existing law of manslaughter as it is applies to organisations, and develop a specific 
crime relating to industrial death. These proposals provide further evidence of this shift away 
from the individual notions of criminal liability for manslaughter to more collective notions 
for attribution of criminal liability to organisations. These proposals are obviously narrower 
in their approach than general rules for attributing criminal responsibility to organisations, 
dealing with just one offence and looking at the law’s response only to industrial death. 
 
First this section examines the more general attribution reforms by explaining aggregation 
principles as they have been proposed by various jurisdictions. It is important to distinguish 
the aggregation principle as it applies to the various mens rea requirements of intent, 
recklessness and negligence, because the aggregation principles tend to vary in their 
application to these measures of fault. The analysis will start with a consideration of the 
proposals already passed into law by the Australian Commonwealth jurisdiction (Criminal 
Code Act 1995 (Cth)) and identically applied in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT Criminal 
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Code 2002). There shall then be a discussion of the recently updated organisational criminal 
responsibility provisions contained in Canadian Criminal Code. 
 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Commonwealth of Australia) Provisions 
 
In Australia, the Criminal Law Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-
General in 1992 put forward a radically different method for attributing criminal 
responsibility to the ‘corporate’ entity.73 This approach hinges on the notion of ‘corporate 
culture’, or the policies and practices adopted by companies as their method of operation. 
The approach is argued to cast ‘a much more realistic net of responsibility over corporations 
than the unrealistically narrow’ Tesco principle 74. The rationale for holding companies liable 
on this basis is that: 
 
‘the policies, standing orders, regulations and institutionalised practices of corporations are 
evidence of corporate aims, intentions and knowledge of individuals within the corporation. 
Such regulations and standing orders are authoritative, not because any individual devised 
them, but because they have emerged from the decision making process recognised as 
authoritative within the organisation.’ (Field and Jorg, 1991: 111)75 
 
The principles have been embodied in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth).76 Section 12.3 
establishes new methods for establishing the mens rea of ‘corporations’ where the fault 
element is other than negligence. It provides that: 
‘1) If intention, knowledge or recklessness is a fault element in relation to a physical element 
of an offence, that fault element must be attributed to a body corporate that expressly, tacitly 
or impliedly authorised or permitted the commission of the offence. 
 
2) The means by which an authorisation or permission may be established include: 
 
(i) proving that the body corporate’s board of directors intentionally, knowingly or 
recklessly carried out the relevant conduct, or expressly, tacitly or impliedly 
authorised or permitted the commission of the offence; or 
                                                 
73  For commentary on the provisions, see Criminal Law Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of 
Attorneys-General (1992: part five) 
74  Ibid at pg. 107 
75  As quoted in the Criminal Law Officers Committee (1992: 111) 
76  The provisions of the Code clearly owe much to the work of Fisse (1990: 605-608); but see his criticism of the 
Interim Report in Fisse (1991: 1) and Fisse (1991: 166). For a discussion of the Criminal Code Act 1995, see Woolf 
(1997: 257) 
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(ii) proving that a high managerial agent of the body corporate intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly engaged in the relevant conduct, or expressly, tacitly or 
impliedly authorised or permitted the commission of the offence; or 
(iii) proving that a corporate culture existed within the body corporate that directed, 
encouraged, tolerated or led to non-compliance with the relevant provision; or 
(iv) proving that the body corporate failed to create and maintain a corporate culture 
that required compliance with the relevant provision.’  
 
The concept of a ‘corporate culture’ is defined in section 12.3(6) as: 
 
‘... an attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practice existing within the body corporate 
generally or in the part of the body corporate in which the relevant activities takes place.’ 
 
 
In section 12.3(6) the board of directors of a corporation is defined as ‘the body exercising 
the corporation’s executive authority, whether or not the body is called the board of 
directors’ and high managerial agent as ‘an employee, agent or officer of the corporation 
whose conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the corporation’s policy because of the 
level of responsibility of his or her duties.’ 
 
Offences such as manslaughter by gross negligence77 that form the basis of a corporate 
manslaughter prosecution are dealt with by section 12.4 which provides that: 
 
‘(2) If  
(a) negligence is a fault element in relation to a physical element of an offence; and  
(b) no individual employee, agent or officer of that body corporate has that fault 
element; 
that fault element may exist on the part of the body corporate if the body 
corporate’s conduct is negligent when viewed as a whole (that is, by aggregating the 
conduct of any number of its employees, agents or officers). 
 
(3) Negligence may be established by the fact that the prohibited conduct was substantially 
attributable to: 
(a) inadequate corporate management, control or supervision of the conduct of one 
or more of its employees, agents or officers; or 
(b) failure to provide adequate systems for conveying information to relevant 
persons in the body corporate.’ 
 
 
                                                 
77  Section 5.5 outlines the ‘fault’ element for negligence, and provides that ‘A person is negligent with respect to a 
physical element of an offence if his or her conduct involves: (a) such a great falling short of the standard of care 
that a reasonable person would exercise in the circumstances; and (b) such a high risk that the physical element 
exists or will exist; that the conduct merits criminal punishment for the offence.’ 
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These Australian Commonwealth proposals partially reject both the Tesco identification and 
personal liability principles as a basis for criminal liability and look more to the corporation’s 
policies and practices as a basis for determining criminal culpability. The proposals also allow 
aggregation of the acts of various individuals as a basis for the criminal liability of the 
corporation.  
 
The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) came into effect in the Commonwealth jurisdiction on 15th 
March 2000. It was envisaged that the Criminal Code would be adopted by all Australian 
States and Territories and would in due course form the basis of all Australian criminal law. 
However, identical provisions to those in the Commonwealth Code have been incorporated 
only in the smallest Australian jurisdiction, the Australian Capital Territory, through the 
Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) in sections 51 (fault elements other than negligence) and 52 
(negligence).78 As States lay down criminal law in Australia, the Commonwealth provisions 
therefore only apply to a very limited range of Commonwealth offences that do not for 
instance relate to traditional criminal offences (like manslaughter) or OHS offences until 
such time as States or territories (like the ACT) legislate otherwise.    
 
Canadian Criminal Code Provisions 
 
The Canadian Federal Parliament has also recently passed similar reforms for attributing 
criminal responsibility to organisations to those adopted by the Australian Commonwealth 
through inserting passages into the Canadian Criminal Code.79 The main purpose of this 
legislation80 was to expand the present common law and in particular the identification 
doctrine, which has been viewed throughout Canadian society as unable to cope with 
situations in which modern corporations in particular should be held criminally accountable 
following industrial death. Therefore the legislation codifies and develops existing law on the 
attribution of criminal responsibility to ‘organisations’ (including corporations).  
                                                 
78  Note that chapter two of the Criminal Code Act 2002 (ACT), which contains these “General Principles of Criminal 
Responsibility’ does not apply to ‘a pre-2003 offence’ (see s 7).  
79  Bill C-45 (Can) became part of the Canadian Criminal Code on 7th November, 2003. For more detailed 
commentary on the new law, see Archibald, Jull and Roach (2004) 
80  The Bill was dubbed the ‘Westray Bill’ following the failure to prosecute both companies and personnel after the 
Westray mining disaster (see Tucker, 1995). 
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 The new laws rely on an expanded term of ‘organisation’ that has been included in section 
two of the Canadian Criminal Code. This term is more expansive than that of the ‘corporation’ 
used in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) in Australia. In the Canadian Criminal Code an 
‘organisation’ is defined as: 
‘(a) a public body, body corporate, society, company, firm, partnership, trade union or 
municipality, or (b) an association of persons that (i) is created for a common purpose, (ii) 
has an operational structure, and (iii) holds itself out to the public as an association of 
persons.’  
 
Also of importance is an extended definition of the term ‘a senior officer,’ which is defined 
in section two as ‘a representative who plays an important role in the establishment of an 
organisation’s policies or is responsible for managing an important aspect of the 
organisation’s activities and, in the case of a body corporate, [automatically] includes a 
director, its chief executive, and its chief financial officer.’ The expanded definition of a 
‘representative’ in respect of the organisation includes a ‘partner, employee, member, agent 
or contractor of the organisation.’ 
 
The new laws lay out the situations in which an organisation shall become a party to an 
offence committed by a representative of the organisation through two provisions: one 
related to negligence offences and another related to offences with fault other than 
negligence. First, section 22(1) of the Criminal Code now states that where the fault element 
of a crime is negligence: 
‘an organisation is party to an offence committed if (a) acting within the scope of their 
authority (1) one of its representatives is a party to the offence, or (2) two or more 
representatives engage in conduct, whether by act or omission, such that, if it had been the 
conduct of only one representative, that representative would have been a party to the 
offence; and (b) the senior officer who is responsible for the aspect of the organisations 
activities that is relevant to the offence departs – or the senior officers collectively, depart – 
markedly from the standard of care that, in the circumstances, could reasonably be expected 
to prevent the representative of the organisation from being a party to the offence.’ 
     
Second, section 22(2) states that where the offence relates to a fault element other than 
negligence: 
 
 
41
‘an organisation is a party to the offence if, with the intent in part to benefit the organisation, 
(a) one of its senior officers (acting within the scope of their authority) is a party to an 
offence; (b) having the mental element required to be a party to the offence and acting 
within the scope of their authority, directs the work of other representatives of the 
organisation so that they do the act or make the omission specified in the offence; or (c) 
knowing that a representative of the organisation is or is about to be a party to the offence, 
does not take all reasonable measures to stop them from being a party to the offence.’ 
 
In conclusion, the Australian Commonwealth proposals (adopted in the Commonwealth and 
ACT) and the Canadian proposals look at changing the rules for attributing all kinds of 
criminal liability to organisations whilst utilising existing criminal offences such as murder 
and gross negligent manslaughter following for instance an industrial death. The new laws 
potentially allow criminal liability to be attached more easily to organisations following 
industrial deaths, although the provisions are as yet untested.  
 
In addition to these general attribution developments, specific new offences have also been 
passed or proposed which apply only when individuals are killed at work and/or in public 
disasters. These new offences seek to overcome the deficiencies outlined in discussion on 
the identification doctrine as it applies to corporate manslaughter and vary according to the 
jurisdiction. These proposals can be distinguished according to jurisdiction by the different 
approaches to issues of attribution that they use and which kinds of industrial death would 
be covered by the particular proposals. These proposals go further to suggest that new 
criminal offences be created rather than rely on the common law rules for manslaughter by 
gross negligence outlined in section three above. 
 
Crimes (Industrial Manslaughter) Amendment Act 2003 (ACT) Provisions 
Following the debate surrounding the Crimes (Industrial Manslaughter) Amendment Bill 2002 
(ACT), the Australian Capital Territory became the first Australian jurisdiction to enact 
specific legislation related to industrial (or corporate) manslaughter on 27th November 2003. 
The Crimes (Industrial Manslaughter) Amendment Act 2003 (ACT) built upon the 2002 Bill and 
created specific criminal offences relating to recklessly or negligently caused industrial death. 
The 2003 Act also built upon the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) that introduced the Model 
Criminal Code provisions on corporate criminal liability into ACT law (as contained in the 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)- see above). It is important to note however that the corporate 
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criminal liability provisions of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) relate only to corporations, 
whereas the 2003 ACT Act covers ‘employers’, which would include ‘employers’ who are not 
corporations.  
 
The impact of the new Crimes (Industrial Manslaughter) Amendment Act 2003 provisions perhaps 
should not be overestimated given that the ACT is a very small Australian jurisdiction (and 
in April 2004 the Commonwealth introduced a Bill to make sure the Act did not apply to 
any Commonwealth government employers);81 since self-government there have been 20 
industrial fatalities and three recorded in 2002/03,82 therefore having significantly lower 
industrial fatality rates than other jurisdictions covered in this paper. The Crimes (Industrial 
Manslaughter) Amendment Act 2003  did not address the issue of attributing criminal liability to 
corporations – this issue had been addressed with the enactment of Part 2.5 of the Criminal 
Code Act 2002 (ACT) (see above), although those provisions did not apply to ‘pre-2003’ 
offences, hence the need to re-enact manslaughter provisions in 2003. Given that the ACT 
Government expects the legislation to address only the most reckless and negligent 
organisations and their senior officers, it may be some time before the complex and legalistic 
provisions are tested in a prosecution and their effectiveness in overcoming common law 
deficiencies becomes assessable. However, as was stated by the ACT Government during 
the passage of this legislation, it is symbolic and a message is sent to citizens that even if the 
offence is never prosecuted in the ACT, an industrial death caused by recklessness or 
negligence is as morally blameworthy and should be as condemned as any other death.83 
 
The Crimes (Industrial Manslaughter) Amendment Act 2003 (ACT) introduces Part 2A (containing 
sections 49A-49E) into the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). Section 49C creates the new offence of 
industrial manslaughter applicable only to ‘employers of workers’. An employer is defined 
specifically in section 49A as ‘(a) a person who engages the worker as a worker of the 
person; or (b) an agent of the person engages the worker as a worker of the agent.’ A worker 
is also defined specifically in the same section as: 
                                                 
81   Occupational Health and Safety (Commonwealth Employment) Amendment (Promoting Safer Workplaces) Bill 2004 
82  ‘Industrial Manslaughter Fact Sheet’ accompanying the Media Release by Katy Gallagher MLA ‘Industrial 
Manslaughter Laws Passed,’ 27th November 2003. 
83  Ibid. 
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‘(a) an employee (defined as a person engaged under a contract of service); or (b) an 
independent contractor (defined as a person engaged under a contract for services); or (c) an 
outworker (defined as an individual engaged by a person (the principal) under a contract for 
services to treat or manufacture articles or materials, or to perform other services— (i) in the 
outworker’s own home; or (ii) on other premises not under the control or management of 
the principal; or (d) an apprentice or trainee; or (e) a volunteer (a person who provides 
services— (1) for, or in relation to, the trade or business of someone else; or (2) for an entity 
for, or in relation to, a religious, educational, charitable or benevolent purpose or otherwise 
in the public interest; and (ii) receives no payment for the provision of the services (other 
than reasonable out-of-pocket expenses).’ 
 
Section 49C states that an employer commits the offence of industrial manslaughter if: 
‘(a) a worker of the employer – (i) dies in the course of employment by, or providing services 
to, or in relation to, the employer; or (ii) is injured in the course of employment by, or 
providing services to, or in relation to, the employer and later dies; and (b) the employer’s 
conduct causes the death of the worker; and (c) the employer is (i) reckless about causing 
serious harm to the worker, or any other worker of the employer, by the conduct; or (ii) 
negligent about causing the death of the worker, or any other worker of the employer, by the 
conduct.’ 
 
Section 49B provides that in terms of the ‘conduct’ that caused the industrial fatality, an 
employer or senior officer’s omission to act can be ‘conduct’ if: 
‘it is an omission to perform the duty to avoid or prevent danger to the life, safety or health 
of a worker of the employer if the danger arises from— (a) an act of the employer or senior 
officer; or (b) anything in the employer or senior officer’s possession or control; or (c) any 
undertaking of the employer or senior officer.’ 
  
The definition of the concepts of recklessness and negligence on which these provisions rely 
are contained in the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) that itself was modelled on the Criminal Code 
Act 1995 (Cth) in relation to persons and corporations. This codified existing common law 
principles of criminal responsibility and introduces new corporate criminal accountability 
provisions (as discussed above). According to section 20(1) Criminal Code 2002 a person (not 
including a corporation) would be reckless in their conduct that lead to an industrial fatality if 
‘(a) they were aware of a substantial risk that serious harm would result to the worker; and 
(b) having regard to the circumstances known to them, it was unjustifiable to take that risk.’ 
The question whether taking a risk is unjustifiable would be a question of fact (section 20 
(3)). According to section 21 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), a person would be negligent in 
relation to causing an industrial fatality if ‘the person’s conduct merits criminal punishment 
for the offence because it involves – (a) such a great falling short of the standard of care that 
a reasonable person would exercise in the circumstances; and (b) such a high risk that death 
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of a worker would result.’ If the person prosecuted was a corporation, then Part 2.5 Criminal 
Code Act 2002 applies, which itself adopts the corporate responsibility provisions of the 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) as outlined above.  
 
Queensland Government Proposals 
 
The Queensland Government Discussion Paper Dangerous Industrial Conduct essentially 
proposed that Queensland incorporate the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), applying to the 
‘corporation’ as a body incorporated under the existing corporations law.84 Under the new 
offence, it was proposed that: 
‘a corporation and its management would be criminally responsible for intentional, reckless 
or negligent behaviour that results in death or injury to persons affected by the activities of 
the corporation [that is, employees and members of the public] where (1) the behaviour was 
dangerous, in that it was unlawful or otherwise fell far below what would reasonably be 
expected [within the current definition of criminal negligence, as discussed above in section 
three]; (2) the behaviour was that of an officer, agent or employee of the corporation acting 
within the actual or apparent scope of their employment or within their actual or apparent 
authority; and (3) where the behaviour was intentional or reckless, the behaviour is to be 
attributed to the corporation if it expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised or permitted the 
behaviour.’ 
 
Section three of the proposals would then relate back to the fault provisions discussed above 
in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). Where the behaviour was negligent, the conduct of any 
number of the corporation’s employees, agents or officers would also be aggregated. The 
Queensland Government however announced that it would not be implementing these new 
proposals for the time being. 
 
Victorian Government Proposals 
 
 In Victoria, following the publication of the Crimes (Industrial Manslaughter) Bill and the 
consultation that preceded and followed it, a revised Crimes (Workplace Deaths and Serious 
Injury) Bill85 was introduced into State Parliament in November 2001. This Bill passed 
                                                 
84   See Queensland Government, Department of Justice and Attorney General (2000) 
85  Crimes (Workplace Deaths and Serious Injuries) Bill – Introduction Print, viewed at  
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through the lower house of Parliament, the Legislative Assembly, but failed to get through 
the upper house, the Legislative Council, in May 2002 and was eventually withdrawn. The 
Bill sought to add additions to the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) in relation only to workplace deaths, 
and would not, if it had become law, have encompassed public disasters. The Victorian 
provisions only covered the death of ‘workers’, defined in section 11 to include ‘employees 
(including senior officers), persons deemed by legislation to be employees, persons 
(including independent contractors) engaged by the employer or by another person on 
behalf of the employer, outworkers, apprentices and trainees, and self-employed persons.’ 
 
The Bill proposed ‘to introduce new criminal offences of corporate manslaughter and 
negligently causing serious injury by a body corporate in certain circumstances; and to 
impose criminal liability on senior officers of a body corporate in certain circumstances.’86 
The revised proposals contained in the Crimes (Workplace Deaths and Serious Injuries) Bill stated 
in section 13: 
‘that a body corporate which by negligence kills (a) an employee in the course of his or her 
employment by the body corporate; or (b) a worker in the course of providing services to, or 
relating to, the body corporate, was guilty of corporate manslaughter.’  
 
For the purposes of this offence, conduct was ‘negligent’ if it involved ‘such a great falling 
short of the standard of care that a reasonable body corporate would exercise in the 
circumstances and such a high risk of death or really serious injury that the conduct merits 
criminal punishment’ (sections 14B(1) and (2)). In determining whether a body corporate 
was negligent, ‘the relevant duty of care is that owed by a body corporate to the person 
killed…’ (section 14B(3)). Such a duty is as contained in the general duties under the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985 (Vic) in sections 21-25. The proposals also stated in 
section 14(B)(4) that in determining whether a body corporate was negligent, the conduct of 
the ‘body corporate as a whole’ must be considered. The proposals then state in sections 
14(B)(5-6): 
‘(5) For the purposes of sub-section (4)- 
(a) subject to paragraph (b), the conduct of any number of the employees, agents or 
senior officers of the body corporate (a) may be aggregated; (b) regard may be had 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://dms.dpc.vic.gov.au/archive/Autumn_2002/bills/B01048/B01048I.html 
86  Crimes (Workplace Deaths and Serious Injuries) Bill – Introduction Print. Also see the speech of Attorney General Mr. 
Hulls to the Legislative Assembly on 22 November 2001, Vic Hansard, p 1921 
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to the negligence of any agent in the provision of services but that negligence must 
not be attributed to the body corporate. 
(6)Without limiting this section, negligence of a body corporate may be evidenced by the 
failure of the body corporate--  
(a) adequately to manage, control or supervise the conduct of one or more of its 
employees, agents or senior officers; or  
(b) to engage as an agent a person reasonably capable of providing the contracted 
services; or (c) to provide adequate systems for conveying relevant information to 
relevant persons in the body corporate; or  
(d) to take reasonable action to remedy a dangerous situation of which a senior 
officer has actual knowledge; or  
(e) to take reasonable action to remedy a dangerous situation identified in a written 
notice served on the body corporate by or under an Act.’ 
 
The Bill was strongly supported by the Victorian Labor Party (who presently and at that time 
formed the Government of Victoria) and also many Australian Trade Unions organisations,87 
but faced strong opposition from the Australian Liberal Party and the National Party (who 
blocked the legislation in the Legislative Council) and also from employers and employer 
associations.88 At present, it is unclear what is to come of the planned reforms as the Labor 
Government has stated they will not reintroduce legislation into Parliament (Skully, 2002). 
This has appeared surprising especially to those within the Victoria Trade Union movement 
as since the December 2002 election, Labor now hold a considerable majority of seats in 
both the Legislative Assembly and a majority in the Legislative Council. It was (according to 
the Labor Party) because of this failure to have a majority in the Legislative Council that the 
Bill failed to become law.  
 
However, the Labor Party has stated that the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985 will be 
updated to ‘ensure Victoria has a coordinated and proactive approach to improve the health 
of Victorian workers’89 and the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985 (Vic) was reviewed (see 
section six below). It may be the Occupational Health and Safety Act will be updated to include 
provisions similar to those proposed on corporate manslaughter,90 or it may be the Victoria 
                                                 
87  Most importantly, the Victorian Trades Hall Congress (VTHC), see media release of VTHC (2002)  
88  Eight employer associations launched a vigorous public campaign to prevent the Bill becoming law, taking out 
full-page newspaper advertisements with the title ‘Minister Hulls, the solution to workplace deaths will not be 
found in bad law!’ The Herald Sun (2002) 
89  Victorian Labor Party (2002), in particular Chapter ten on ‘Fairness and Safety at Work,’  
90  In a recent response to a letter from Deanne and Jack May of the Industrial Deaths Support & Advocacy Inc. 
(IDSA) to Attorney General Rob Hulls, the Attorney General stated ‘The Government remains committed to 
implementing its promise for all Victorians to enjoy a safe workplace. While the Government does not currently 
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Government are keeping a keen eye on developments in other jurisdictions, including 
England and Wales.  
 
British Government Proposals 
 
The English Law Commission in a Consultation Paper in 1994 looked at the issues raised by 
involuntary manslaughter. It proposed a new test of killing by gross carelessness to replace 
‘gross negligence’ manslaughter (as discussed above in section three). The test posited in 
1994 would be three pronged: (a) did the defendant’s conduct cause the death?; (b) ought the 
defendant reasonably to have been aware of a significant risk that her or his conduct could 
result in death or serious injury?; and (c) did the defendant’s conduct fall seriously and 
significantly below what could reasonably have been demanded of her or him in preventing 
that risk from occurring or in preventing the risk, once in being, from resulting in the 
prohibited harm? (Law Commission, 1994) 
 
More important, for our purposes, the Commission proposed that there be a special regime 
applying to corporate liability for manslaughter, but emphasised that it was concerned to 
work out ways in which the ‘general law of manslaughter may be applied in the particular 
circumstances of the corporation, and not whether standards and requirements should apply 
to corporations which are different from those which apply generally’ (Law Commission, 
1994: 127). The Commission argued that the real difficulties with attributing criminal liability 
to corporations lay in trying to attach liability for crimes of conscious wrong doing (that is, 
those requiring mens rea as discussed above in section two). The crime of manslaughter 
proposed by the Commission was not, it argued, a crime of conscious wrong doing, but one of 
neglect or omission, occurring in the context of serious objective culpability. For these 
reasons they simply proposed that in relation to corporations, ‘the direct question would be 
whether the corporation fell within the criteria for liability of that offence’ as described 
above (Law Commission, 1994: 129). In affect the Commission retained the traditional 
                                                                                                                                                 
propose to re-introduce the previous Bill, other ways to toughen occupational health and safety laws are being 
considered.’ Response dated 20th February 2003 
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identification attribution principle discussed in section two, although it seemed to have 
broadened the range of individuals whose knowledge could be attributed to the corporation.  
 
As to the question of whether the corporation should have been aware of the risk, the 
Commission emphasised that a corporation chooses the types of business activities it 
conducted, and the question was simply whether the persons responsible for taking the 
business decisions of the organisation were, or should have been, ‘aware of a significant risk 
that those organisations, either at their commencement or during their continued pursuit, 
could result in death or serious injury’ (Law Commission, 1994: 130). This might involve 
having to examine the nature of the company’s operations or the degree of hazard in some 
detail.  
 
As to the third issue, the company’s conduct in dealing with the risk, the inquiry was whether 
the company arranged its affairs in a reasonable way given the presence of the risk. In other 
words, how did the company operate to prevent injury or death? The steps taken by the 
company to discharge the duty of safety, and the systems it has created to run its business, 
would be directly relevant (Law Commission, 1994: 131-132). 
 
Following consultation, the Law Commission radically altered its position in a report 
published in March 1996 (Law Commission, 1996). It rejected the possibility of making 
corporations personally liable in the sense now accepted in relation to the general duties in 
the OHS statutes (see sections one and two above), on the grounds that ‘it would virtually 
make the corporation strictly liable for the acts and omissions of any employee which 
resulted in death’ (Law Commission, 1996: 7.26/7.27). Instead the Commission proposed to 
apply the elements of the individual offence of killing by gross carelessness, outlined above, 
but ‘in a form adapted to the corporate context and, in particular, in a form that does not 
involve the principle of identification’ (Law Commission, 1996: 7.36).  
 
In particular, the Law Commission removed the issue of whether the corporation was aware 
of the risk of death or serious injury, or whether a reasonable person in the position of the 
corporation would have been aware of the risk, because it accepted that it is impossible to 
place a corporation in the same position as a human being. In effect this change removed 
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the need to impute mens rea to a company through identifying a natural person who had the 
required knowledge or intention, but retained the other two elements of the Commission’s 
proposed test for manslaughter. The first element, causation, was adapted slightly in relation 
to corporations in the 1996 proposal. For individuals, it must be shown that she or he acted 
in a particular way, and that this conduct caused the death. For a corporation, the question 
focuses not on individual conduct, but on ‘management failure’ (Law Commission, 1996: 
8.19), and requires an examination of things done in the management and organisation of 
the company, rather than on a purely operational level. This does suggest that the chain of 
causation might be broken if the actual cause of the fatality was the actions of someone 
outside management (Ridley and Dunford, 1997: 110).  
 
A corporation would be guilty of corporate killing if ‘(a) a management failure by the 
corporation is the cause or one of the causes of a person’s death; and (b) that failure 
constitutes conduct falling far below what can reasonably be expected of the corporation in 
the circumstances.’ For the purposes of this definition, there was said to be a management 
failure on behalf of the corporation if ‘(a) the way in which its activities are managed or 
organized fails to ensure the health and safety of persons employed in or effected by those 
activities; and (b) such a failure may be regarded as a cause of a person’s death 
notwithstanding that the immediate cause is the act or omission of an individual.’  
 
In short, the Commission’s revised proposal is that a corporation would be guilty of 
corporate killing if at least one of the causes of a person’s death could be attributed to 
management failure, and that failure constituted conduct falling far below what could 
reasonably be expected of a corporation in the circumstances. Management failure would 
occur if ‘the way in which an organisation’s activities were managed or organised failed to 
ensure the health and safety of persons affected by those activities.’91  
 
Since 1996 British Governments have had before them the report by the Law Commission 
relating to a new offence of corporate manslaughter. In May 2000, some years following the 
Law Commission’s report, and after a crucial New Labour election pledge in 1997 to 
                                                 
91  Law Commission (1996) and HSE (1996: 2). For comment on the proposals, see Wells (1996) and Ridley and 
Dunford (1997) 
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introduce new laws relating to corporate manslaughter, the public was consulted about what 
was considered the appropriate form for legislation to take92 (Home Office, 2000). The new 
offence of corporate manslaughter proposed by the Law Commission and accepted in the 
Government’s consultation document seemed to be primarily addressing the present 
problems relating to the attribution of criminal responsibility towards corporate bodies for 
both public disasters and workplace deaths.93 
 
As discussed above, the Law Commission recommended in its report utilising a concept of 
‘management failure’ as the basis for attributing liability to corporations for corporate 
manslaughter. The Government’s consultation document stated ‘The Government considers 
that while there may prove to be difficulties in proving a “management failure” there is a 
need to restore public confidence that companies responsible for loss of life can properly be 
held accountable in law…’ (Home Office, 2000: 15). And so despite noting that there may 
be difficulty in applying the concept of management failure,94 and despite very little 
discussion of what the term actually meant in practice, the Government generally supported 
the findings of the Law Commission and proposed to adopt these findings subject to the 
suggestion that the offence potentially apply not just to body corporates but to a wider 
category of ‘undertakings.’95  
 
                                                 
92  For a critical discussion of the whole process of regulatory reform and consultation relating to corporate 
manslaughter legislation in the United Kingdom, see Tombs and Whyte (2003) 
93  The government outlined in its consultation document that ‘There have been a number of disasters in recent 
years, which have evoked demands for the use of the law of manslaughter, and failures to successfully prosecute 
have led to an apparent perception among the public that the law dealing with corporate manslaughter is 
inadequate. This perception has been heightened because the disasters have been followed by inquiries which 
have found corporate bodies at fault and meriting very serious criticism and in some instances there have been 
successful prosecutions for offences under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974… The Law Commission also 
considered that there were many cases of deaths in factories and building sites where death could and should 
have been avoided…(The HSE commented) In the majority of such cases the disaster is caused as a result of a 
failure of systems controlling the risk with the carelessness of individuals being a contributing factor.’ See Home 
Office (2000:: 13-14) 
94  See also Wells’ somewhat critical commentary of the Law Commission’s proposals, where she suggests that ‘It 
will undoubtedly be easier in many cases to address corporate culpability through “management failure” than 
through the directing mind notion. But it is not enough to speak of “management” or “the way its activities are 
managed or organized” without resurrecting the same old problems: which employees and which systems can be 
said to be those of the company? If there is one lesson from the P&O and other corporate killing sagas, it is that 
corporate defendants are highly motivated and well placed to exploit the metaphysical gap between “the 
company” and its members’ (2001, 125-126). See also Sutton and Haines (2003: 154), where the authors suggest 
larger companies have the resources to dispute the law and to exploit its ambiguities and can avoid prosecution 
for this reason 
95  An ‘undertaking’ was defined as ‘any trade or business or other activity providing employment’ (Home Office, 
2000: 15-16) 
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Despite a vast response to the consultation document and numerous calls for legislation 
from interested parties, the issue of what form corporate manslaughter legislation would take 
was subject to a ‘brief regulatory assessment (RIA)96 two years later. The official line from 
the Home Office during the past few years has been that ‘The Government is committed to 
extending criminal liability for involuntary manslaughter to corporations … and will do so 
when Parliamentary time allows…’97  
 
On 21st May 2003, conscious of the manifesto pledge shadowing the Government, in the 
face of noisier campaigning, and in an apparent plan to protect the passage of the new 
Criminal Justice Bill through Parliament, announcements were made that the government 
‘intended’ to legislate on corporate manslaughter.98 Nothing has since been published. It is 
therefore unclear what form any proposed legislation may take and whether it will build on 
the proposals as contained in the consultation document of May 2000. The issue of crown 
immunity for any proposed offence and the breadth of application of the developed offence 
(as to who it shall apply to) seem to be requiring further thought. Reports suggested that 
when proposals were released in Autumn 2003 (although this date has now passed) they will 
be subject to further consultation (Mathiason, 2003), leading many to ask whether there will 
ever be a new law. One is left wondering whether the promises contained in both the 1997 
and 2001 election manifestos will ever be fulfilled? 
 
                                                 
96  In response to the one of the authors’ emails to the Home Office, this reply was received on 11th December. ‘An 
RIA is a routine part of policy making in areas which the Government intends to legislate. It is necessary in order 
that policy aims are proportionate to the costs that may be incurred by businesses and other organizations 
concerned. The RIA will inform the process of deciding what the legislation will look like finally...The 
Government has yet to make final decisions on these proposals…’ 
97  Ibid. Andrew Dismore MP has been a vocal critic of the governments lack of progress in the area of corporate 
manslaughter and has recently filed an early day motion in Parliament, ‘Corporate Manslaughter Early Day 
Motion 793,’ viewed on the web at http://edm.ais.co.uk/weblink/html/motion.html/ref=793. It states ‘That 
this House regrets that since 1997, over 2000 workers and members of the public have died in work-related 
incidents, as well as the Southall, Paddington, Hatfield and Potters Bar disasters; notes that during the same 
period only four companies and two directors have been convicted of the offence of manslaughter and that these 
were all small firms; recalls that the Law Commission recommended a new offence of corporate manslaughter in 
1996 to hold large as well as small undertakings to account for causing death through grossly negligent failures of 
management; believes that such an offence would increase the accountability of directors and their equivalents, 
and encourage better safety standards in undertakings; and calls on the Government to put before Parliament 
measures to enact a new offence of corporate manslaughter as soon as possible.’ The early day motion however 
has very little political force and no legal force 
98  The Home Office stated ‘A timetable for legislation and further details will be announced this autumn,’ viewed at 
http://www.ukonline.gov.uk/News/NewsArticle/fs/en?CONTENT_ID=4006654&chk=Em8TfT 
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Despite the British Government announcing that the existing law of corporate manslaughter 
is unworkable, particularly when applied to industrial deaths occurring within larger 
corporations, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) has suggested that there is a realistic 
prospect99 of conviction of companies for corporate manslaughter and individual 
directors/senior personnel for gross negligent manslaughter in the case of both the Hatfield 
rail disaster and Barrow Borough Council’s role in a legionnaires outbreak. The CPS has 
decided it is in the public interest to go ahead with these prosecutions. If these prosecutions 
resulted in conviction, one could be left with the situation where the existing law (and the 
application of the identification doctrine) is seen to be workable if in fact there is evidence of 
gross negligence on behalf of the senior personnel of larger companies and if the case is 
investigated and prosecuted properly (see section nine below). And if this was the case, 
would a new law in fact be necessary? It could just be that the Government might leave such 
decisions to the judiciary and wait and see. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Some of these new offences discussed in this section cover not only manslaughter-type 
crimes but also crimes for causing serious injury to workers or members of the public. 
However this subject is beyond the scope of this paper. For example, the proposed 
Victorian reforms created the offences of corporate manslaughter for workplace fatalities 
(section 13) but also the offence of negligently causing serious injury (section 14).  The 
Queensland reform proposals covered deaths and ‘grievous bodily harm.’  
 
This section outlines various attempts to address existing deficiencies in the law in order to 
conduct manslaughter prosecutions more effectively and therefore also to increase the 
number of prosecutions against organisations (including but not exclusively so the 
corporation) following industrial deaths. The proposals are seeking to reform the 
identification doctrine as the principle applied to issues of organisational accountability using 
existing traditional criminal law either by reforming the general law of attributing criminal 
                                                 
99  This is the test that the CPS must apply alongside a public interest test when prosecuting under the criminal law 
(CPS 2000)  
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liability to organisations to enable the mens rea of a number of individuals to be aggregated, 
or by bringing in specific new offences relating to industrial death. None of the laws 
implemented have yet been tested by prosecutors and so the effectiveness of the legally 
complex provisions is still in question. However, it cannot be denied that the attempt to 
utilise an aggregation style approach to the issue of organisational criminal responsibility, 
looking holistically at an organisations’ actions and its systems of management, is a brave and 
contemporary step forward for criminal legal doctrine as it is applied in an organisational 
context.   
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Section Five  
Reforms In The Criminal Law’s Response To Industrial Deaths: Individuals within 
the Organisation – Where Are We Now? 
 
As briefly discussed above, individual actors within organisations (whether directors, 
managers or front line workers) can already be prosecuted under existing OHS statutes and 
traditional criminal law if their conduct is deemed morally culpable and they satisfy the tests 
of criminal liability. The traditional criminal law provisions, and some of the provisions 
under the OHS statutes (see for example, section 52 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 
1985 (Vic), but contrast section 26 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW)) 
require the presence of some kind of mens rea.  
 
For instance, an individual whose acts or omissions satisfy the gross negligent manslaughter 
test (as laid down in section three) can be prosecuted and convicted as a worker, manager or 
director of an organisation just as if they were an individual citizen and had been grossly 
negligent in events that led to another’s death. All of the OHS statutes provide for individual 
liability of workers and (apart from the Commonwealth and the ACT) senior organisational 
personnel that, in certain circumstances, can be prosecuted alongside the organisational 
liability prosecutions. Some of the provisions require some form of mens rea to be proven. 
For example, section 52(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985 (Vic) provides that 
where an offence against the Act committed by a body corporate is proved to have been 
committed with the ‘consent or connivance of, or to have been attributable to any wilful 
neglect on the part of, an officer of the body corporate that officer is also guilty of that 
offence.’ Section 52(3) provides that an ‘officer’ means ‘a director, secretary, executive 
officer, any person in accordance with whose directions the directors are accustomed to act, 
or a person involved in the management of the body corporate.’ Similar provisions can be 
found in Western Australia and the Northern Territory (see further Johnstone, 2004a: 431-
436). 
 
These provisions can be contrasted with similar individual liability provisions in for instance 
New South Wales or Queensland States in Australia where there is a reverse burden of proof 
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and no mens rea requirement in particular individual prosecutions under the OHS statutes. 
Section 26(1) Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW) provides that if a corporation 
contravenes any provisions of this Act or its regulations, ‘each director of the company, and 
each person concerned in the management of the corporation’ is taken to have contravened 
the same provision unless the director or person satisfies the court that ‘he or she was not in 
a position to influence the conduct of the corporation or he or she, being in such a position, 
used all due diligence to prevent contravention by the corporation’ (see also Johnstone, 
2004a: 432-433). 
 
As we have discussed above, however, rarely are individuals prosecuted and convicted in 
response to industrial deaths either for traditional or OHS offences (HSE 2002/2003; 
Unison and CCA 2003). This in part has been the result of both the ambiguous wording 
used in OHS statutes and the tests applied by traditional criminal law (i.e. difficulty of 
proving that an individual owed a duty of care to the deceased in a prosecution for gross 
negligent manslaughter). Therefore in the past decade numerous proposals have aimed to 
add additional criminal offences in relation to corporate officers to the existing OHS 
statutes, as well as suggesting new offences that would fall under the ambit of traditional 
criminal law.  
 
Some of these proposals have also sought to overcome the difficulties in proving that a duty 
of care was owed by senior management to a deceased worker, by creating an explicit duty of 
care on behalf of all involved in management of organisational activities towards workers. 
This explicit duty could take the form of a general obligation on senior organisational 
personnel to protect workers’ health and safety or to do everything ‘reasonable’ to 
implement a safe system of work. Such a duty of care would build upon or perhaps replace 
those few exceptions at present to the rule that no duty of care is owed to workers by senior 
organisational personnel. It would also reduce the difficulties in establishing that a duty has 
been breached, that the failure to act as amounted to gross, criminal, negligence, and that the 
gross negligence had caused the death. This reform would enable the existing offence of 
gross negligent manslaughter to be more widely used against senior organisational personnel 
and therefore also against the organisations themselves (as corporate manslaughter) through 
the ‘directing mind and will’ identification test outlined in section two above.     
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 The additional offences that have been proposed to apply to individual organisational 
personnel often also piggy back onto organisational offences by individuals ‘contributing to’ 
any new organisational offence. Some proposals have even, at various stages of their 
development, suggested automatic liability of directors if their organisation had been found 
liable under an organisational OHS or traditional criminal law offence. Such measures could 
be interpreted to be in blatant disregard for human rights and presumptions of innocence, 
and have usually been rejected early on in the legislative drafting process. Some proposals 
have introduced the complex issue of objective culpability based on what it is suggested a 
reasonable director or senior officer should have known or done, as opposed to their actual 
fault and actual moral culpability in what they thought or did. Such issue leads to a 
discussion as to why senior officer of organisations should be treated in this way, and general 
criminals not.  
 
Crimes (Industrial Manslaughter) Amendment Act 2003 (ACT) Provisions 
 
As noted above in section four, the Crimes (Industrial Manslaughter) Amendment Act 2003 (ACT) 
creates two new offences of industrial manslaughter by recklessness and by negligence which 
are also applicable to senior officers. Section 49D creates the new offence of industrial 
manslaughter applicable to senior officers of the employer that employs the killed worker. A 
senior officer is defined extensively in section 49A as meaning: 
‘(a) for an employer that is a government, or an entity so far as it is a government entity—
any of the following: (i) a Minister in relation to the government or government entity; (ii) a 
person occupying a chief executive officer position (however described) in relation to the 
government or government entity; (iii) a person occupying an executive position (however 
described) in relation to the government or government entity who makes, or takes part in 
making, decisions affecting all, or a substantial part, of the functions of the government or 
government entity; or  
(b) for an employer that is another corporation (including a corporation so far as it is not a 
government entity)—an officer of the corporation; or  
(c) for an employer that is another entity—any of the following: (i) a person occupying an 
executive position (however described) in relation to the entity who makes, or takes part in 
making, decisions affecting all, or a substantial part, of the functions of the entity; (ii) a 
person who would be an officer of the entity if the entity were a corporation.’ 
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An officer of a corporation is also defined extensively in section 49A as meaning the 
definition of officer in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), section nine, where officer is:  
‘(a) a director or secretary of the corporation; or  
(b) a person: (i) who makes, or participates in making, decisions that affect the whole, or a 
substantial part, of the business of the corporation; or (ii) who has the capacity to affect 
significantly the corporation's financial standing; or (iii) in accordance with whose 
instructions or wishes the directors of the corporation are accustomed to act (excluding 
advice given by the person in the proper performance of functions attaching to the person's 
professional capacity or their business relationship with the directors or the corporation); or  
(c) a receiver, or receiver and manager, of the property of the corporation; or  
(d) an administrator of the corporation; or  
(e) an administrator of a deed of company arrangement executed by the corporation; or  
(f) a liquidator of the corporation; or  
(g) a trustee or other person administering a compromise or arrangement made between the 
corporation and someone else.’ 
 
Section 49D states that the senior officer commits the offence of industrial manslaughter if: 
‘(a) a worker of the employer – (i) dies in the course of employment by, or providing services 
to, or in relation to, the employer; or (ii) is injured in the course of employment by, or 
providing services to, or in relation to, the employer and later dies; and  
(b) the senior officer’s conduct causes the death of the worker ; and  
(c) the senior officer is (i) reckless about causing serious harm to the worker, or any other 
worker of the employer, by the conduct; or (ii) negligent about causing the death of the 
worker, or any other worker of the employer, by the conduct.’ 
 
As was noted above in section four, section 49B provides that in terms of the conduct that 
caused the industrial fatality, an employer or senior officer’s omission to act can be conduct 
if it is an omission to perform the duty to avoid or prevent danger to the life, safety or health 
of a worker of the employer if the danger arises from ‘(a) an act of the employer or senior 
officer; or (b) anything in the employer or senior officer’s possession or control; or (c) any 
undertaking of the employer or senior officer.’ The terms negligence and recklessness were also 
defined in the previous section in relation to their application to the organisational offences 
under the Criminal Code Act 2002. 
 
The Victorian Government Proposals 
 
The Victorian revised Crimes (Workplace Deaths and Serious Injury) Bill attempted to build the 
liability of ‘senior officers’ onto the corporate offences outlined above in section four. 
 
 
58
‘Senior officer’ has the same meaning as ‘officer’ has in relation to a corporation in the 
Corporations Act 1990 (Vic), namely: 
‘(a) a director or secretary of the corporation; or  
(b) a person: (i) who makes, or participates in making, decisions that affect the whole, or a 
substantial part, of the business of the corporation; or (ii) who has the capacity to affect 
significantly the corporation’s financial standing; or (iii) in accordance with whose instructions 
and wishes the directors of the corporation are accustomed to act (excluding advice given by 
the person in the proper performance of functions attaching to the person’s professional 
capacity or their business relationship with the directors of the corporation) …’ 
     
Sub-section 14C(1) provided that if it was proven the body corporate had committed 
(although not necessarily was convicted of) the crime of corporate manslaughter (see 
previous section), a senior officer of that body corporate could also be found liable for an 
indictable offence. Senior officers acting without any fee, gain or reward could not be liable 
for these offences. This senior-officer crime would have committed the offence if: 
‘(a) a senior officer of the body corporate:   
(i) was organisationally responsible for the conduct, or part of the conduct, of the 
body corporate in relation to the commission of the offence by the body corporate; 
and  
(ii) in performing or failing to perform his or her organisational responsibilities, 
contributed materially to the commission of the offence by the body corporate; and  
(iii) knew that, as a consequence of his or her conduct, there was a substantial risk 
that the body corporate would engage in conduct that involved a high risk of death 
or really serious injury to a person; and 
(b) having regard to the circumstances known to the senior officer, it was unjustifiable to 
allow the substantial risk referred to in paragraph (a)(iii) to exist.’  
  
The Bill then went on in section 14C(3) to state that: 
‘For the purposes of sub-sections (1)(a)(i), without limiting the matters that may be 
considered in determining whether a senior officer of a body corporate is organisationally 
responsible for the conduct, or part of the conduct, of the body corporate in relation to the 
commission of the offence by the body corporate, consideration may be given to- 
(a) the extent to which the senior officer was in a position to make, or influence the 
making of, a decision concerning the manner in which the conduct, or that part of 
the conduct, was performed; and  
(b) the participation of the senior officer in a decision of the board of directors of 
the body corporate concerning the manner in which the conduct, or that part of the 
conduct, was performed; and  
(c) the degree of participation of the senior officer in the management of the body 
corporate.’ 
 
Western Australia Laing Report Proposals 
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The recent Laing Report in Western Australia discussed at length the existing liability of 
senior officers under the Western Australian Criminal Code and Occupational Safety and Health Act  
1984 (WA) (Laing Report, 2002: 122-132). It recommended (recommendation 34) that the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act be amended to make senior officers liable for the death or 
serious injury of workers if the deceased or injured was owed a duty of care by the 
corporation, the senior officer breached this duty and the breach was one of gross 
negligence. This recommendation would lapse in ‘the event that investigation procedures 
under the Criminal Code and/or amendment of the Criminal Code provide an effective 
alternative process.’ These recommendations have not yet been acted upon. 
 
Queensland Government Proposals 
 
The Queensland Discussion Paper also recommended a new offence for individuals of 
‘dangerous industrial conduct’ where they ‘behave dangerously in a workplace (that is, in a 
way that was unlawful or fell far below what would reasonably be accepted)’ and the 
behaviour results ‘in death or grievous bodily harm.’ This offence was discussed in the 
previous section and the Discussion Paper provides no further elaboration of the individual 
liability provisions. While this recommendation would appear to overcome the ‘duty’ issue 
discussed earlier in this paper, it might still not address the ‘omissions’ issue. 
 
British Government Proposals 
 
Again, as noted in  section four, the Home Office proposed two new crimes of reckless 
killing and killing by gross negligence, and these crimes would be applicable to senior 
officers of corporations or undertakings. The proposals also suggested that company 
directors be able to be disqualified if it was found that their conduct has ‘contributed’ to the 
corporation committing the offence of ‘corporate killing.’ Although as was noted above it is 
unclear what the present status of the Home Office proposals are, what is clear is that 
individual offences attaching to senior management and directors have been dropped from 
the proposals. 
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 The Duty Of Care Issue 
 
The other issue that proposals have discussed addressing is the issue of the duty of care 
owed by senior management or the directors of an organisation to a person killed through 
industrial activity. If a specific duty of care was created between senior management and the 
deceased, in the form of a duty of care on behalf of senior management to ensure the health 
and safety of their workers is maintained, this duty could then form the basis of prosecution 
of individuals under existing gross negligent manslaughter law. Following on from this, a 
new explicit duty could therefore facilitate successful corporate manslaughter prosecutions 
through the identification doctrine as it presently exists.  
 
Canadian Criminal Code Provisions 
 
The Canadian legislation discussed above has introduced a specific duty along these lines 
into the Criminal Code (section 217.1). Section 217.1 provides that ‘everyone who 
undertakes, or has authority, to direct how another person does work or performs a task is 
under a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent bodily harm to that person, or any 
other person, arising from that work or task.’ The Government stated that they see this 
clause as a codification of the similar duty in existence under common law. 
 
British Government Proposals 
 
Similar proposals have been put forward in relation to a duty on company directors in the 
England and Wales. In Revitalising Health and Safety: Strategy Statement June 2000 (DETR, 2000) 
the British Government first proposed to legislate in this area in June 2000. Action Point 11 
of this document stated that: 
‘The Health and Safety Commission will develop a code of practice on Directors’ 
responsibilities for health and safety, in conjunction with stakeholders. It is intended that the 
code of practice will, in particular, stipulate that organisations should appoint an individual 
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Director for health and safety, or responsible person of similar status… The Health and 
Safety Commission will also advise Ministers on how the law would need to be changed to 
make these responsibilities statutory so that Directors and responsible persons of similar 
status are clear about what is expected of them in their management of health and safety. It 
is the intention of Ministers, when Parliamentary time allows, to introduce legislation on 
these responsibilities’ (DETR, 2000: 26).    
 
 
The Health and Safety Executive went on to publish guidance to directors on such issues in 
July 2001 by setting out best practice in five action points. The guidance was to apply to all 
types of organisations in both the private and public sectors. The guidance was, however, 
voluntary and did not place any legal obligations on companies. The five action points were 
as follows: 
‘(1) The board needs to accept formally and publicly its collective role in providing health 
and safety leadership in its organisation 
(2) Each member of the board needs to accept their individual role in providing health and 
safety leadership for their organisation 
(3) The board needs to ensure that all board decisions reflect its health and safety intentions, 
as articulated in the health and safety policy statement 
(4) The board needs to recognise its role in engaging the active participation of workers in 
improving health and safety; and  
(5) The board needs to ensure that it is kept informed of, and alert to, relevant health and 
safety risk management issues. The Health and Safety Commission recommends 
that boards appoint one of their number to be the health and safety director’ (HSE, 2001100) 
 
 
As no Parliamentary action was undertaken to legislate in the area of directors’ duties, the 
Company Directors’ (Health and Safety) Bill was introduced by Ross Cranston MP under the Ten 
Minute Rule on 25th March 2003. The bill proposed to insert into the Companies Act 1985 
provisions on directors’ duties regarding OHS, and in section 309A stated: 
‘(1) It is the duty of the directors of a company to exercise their powers to discharge their 
duties in the interests of the health and safety of its employees and others affected by its 
operations. 
(2) It is the duty of the directors of the company to take effective steps to ensure that the 
company acts in accordance with the obligations imposed on it by any applicable law relating 
to health and safety. 
(3) The directors of a company are to be taken to meet the requirements of subsection (2) if 
they (a) act reasonably and in good faith; (b) inform themselves about the company’s health 
and safety obligations in the particular circumstances of its operation; and (c) consider any 
report of a health and safety director appointed under section 282 (4) of the Act.’ 
 
 
                                                 
100  For research on the implementation of this guidance, see HSE (2003a)  
 
 
62
The Bill (through inserting section 282 (4) into the Companies Act 1985) then placed an 
obligation on public companies to appoint a health and safety director among its directors 
(as required under the HSC guidance) and to publish clearly in company’s annual reports the 
name of their health and safety directors. The Bill also inserted section 309B into the 
Companies Act, relating to the duties of the company health and safety director. It states: 
‘(1) It shall be the duty of the health and safety director appointed under section 284 (2) of 
this Act (a) to monitor on a regular basis the health and safety performance of the company; 
(b) to ensure the health and safety statement of the company reflects current board priorities 
on the matter; (c) to ensure that the company’s management systems provide for effective 
monitoring and reporting of its health and safety performance; (d) to report to other 
directors immediately on any significant health and safety failure in the company and on 
recommendations for changes; and (e) to report to the board on health and safety 
implications of decisions….’ 
 
The Bill did not progress beyond its second reading and was not taken up by the 
Government. Evidence suggests that the HSE have now decided not to recommend that 
legal duties be imposed upon company directors.101 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has now laid out new laws and proposals both for developed organisational and 
individual criminal responsibility following industrial deaths. This section has explored ways 
in which senior organisational personnel can be brought under existing OHS and traditional 
criminal law so as to facilitate prosecutions of corporate officers with particular 
responsibility for industrial deaths. These proposals create express requirements on senior 
personnel in relation to OHS which would facilitate prosecution by creating express criminal 
offences for actions or omissions that would not under existing law be criminal. It is 
important to note also however that the Canadian law originally in its draft stages proposed 
individual offences attached to the organisational liability reforms but these were dropped. It 
seems also that this has been the case with the British proposals. The issue of individual 
liability relating to industrial deaths seems to be much more contentious issue than 
organisational liability. 
 
                                                 
101  See http://www.corporateaccountability.org/directors/govt.htm  
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In the next section of the paper we review the organisational sanctions debate and look at 
the contemporary sanctions attached to the laws and proposals outlined above. The 
proposals have not only considered or brought into law contemporary means of attributing 
criminal responsibility to corporations and their personnel through introducing new laws and 
news attribution methods, but have also reconsidered the need to impose upon 
organisational actors effective and innovative sanctions suited to their particular context and 
the crimes that have been committed.  
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Section Six 
The Forgotten Sanctions Debate: Providing Context 
 
The developments in the law on criminal responsibility for industrial deaths have not been 
accompanied by fundamental reform of sanctions that can be attached to organisations and 
their personnel following criminal conviction for both OHS and traditional criminal law 
offences (Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999: 256). This is in contrast to the ever-growing 
sanctioning options for non-organisational offenders.  
 
The fine is still the most widely used sanction against organisations and their personnel 
following an industrial death, despite numerous discussions drawing attention to the 
availability of innovative and alternative organisational sanctions (Cahill and Cahill, 1999; 
Fisse, 1983; Gobert, 1998; Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999; Heine, 1999; Wells, 2001). 
Indeed, the use of fines against organisations has been subject to much academic criticism 
(see in particular the discussions in Gunningham and Johnstone (1999: 257-259) and Wells 
(2001: 32-37)). Criticisms have focused on the effectiveness and equity of using fines to 
punish organisational offenders. These grounds include: the low level of the maximum fines 
available, and of the actual penalties imposed. Offenders can simply pay the fine and not 
remedy the hazard, review its OHS systems, or discipline the managers responsible for the 
offence — suggesting to offenders that offences are ‘purchasable commodities’ (Fisse, 1994: 
103); the impact of fines can be passed on to ‘innocent parties’, such as consumers, workers 
and others, who can do little to remedy the OHS systems failure; and fines affect the 
financial values of the company, and not non-financial motivations (for example, reputation 
and pride) which might shape attitudes to OHS (see further Gunningham and Johnstone, 
1999: 256-258). 
 
Given that organisational offences and offenders vary, there seems to be a strong case for 
variety in the sanctions available in an organisational sanctions regime. However, it seems 
that the criminal justice and regulatory systems in most of Australia, Canada and the United 
Kingdom have merely modelled organisational sanctions on the use of the fine and 
imprisonment. Sanctions have merely been taken from an individual human offender 
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context and inserted into an organisational offender context (Stone, 1978: 357-8).  Also in 
contrast to the sanctioning frameworks applied to non-organisational offenders, in the 
organisational context there appears to be little regard for making the sanction fit the 
particular offender and offence, by investigating the background of an organisational 
offender, its assets, and how these two factors could be relevant in the level of sanction that 
should be imposed in response to a particular criminal conviction in order to have a 
beneficial effect on future organisational conduct (Wells, 2001: 32). There seems to have 
been a lack of thought in how organisational sanctions regimes could achieve more effective 
and utilitarian outcomes.      
 
The innovative and contemporary approaches in attributing criminal liability to organisations 
following industrial deaths (see above in sections four and five) presents the opportunity for 
a wide ranging discussion of innovative organisational sanctions and the need for a 
contemporary look at what is available and useful in this context. If the reforms to the law 
itself are to be effective in altering organisational behaviour with the hope of reducing the 
number of deaths related to industrial activity, then the issue of sanctions appears paramount 
in bringing about utilitarian benefits beyond simply the law’s symbolic power in condemning 
wrong doing. To these reforms we shall return in section seven. In this section, we discuss 
the general sanctioning options available to a judge or jury following criminal conviction of 
an organisation and its personnel and we shall briefly highlight the non-court ordered actions 
which a regulator can undertake following breach of OHS statutes. 
 
Financial Penalties – Where are we now? 
 
Following an industrial death the financial penalty is the most widely used sanction available 
to a court once there has been a criminal conviction against an organisation or its personnel.  
Yet the level of fines imposed on organisations and their personnel following industrial 
deaths have been historically low and at times described by the courts as ‘derisory’ (Wells, 
2001: 33). Commentators have also drawn attention to the minimal impact that even the 
largest fines awarded can have on larger corporations (Gobert, 1994: 394; Wells, 2001: 32)   
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In Australia from the late 1980s, the courts (particularly in New South Wales and Victoria) 
began to develop sentencing principles for offenders contravening the OHS statutes. The 
courts have emphasised that deterrence is the rationale behind sentencing (although some 
influential cases have adverted to corporate ‘rehabilitation’). In determining the level of fine, 
the courts must reflect the gravity of the offence – the nature of the breach rather than the 
consequences (for a discussion of the relevant cases, see Johnstone, 2003: 246-258; 
Johnstone, 2004a: 450-455; and Thompson, 2000: 53-64). The levels of fines for OHS 
offences in Australia have generally been relatively low (see Johnstone, 2004a: 456-457) 
although in recent years there have been some substantial fines.  
 
A turning point in England and Wales was the Court of Appeal’s judgement in R v Howe and 
Son (Engineers) Ltd.102 The court stated that fines imposed for OHS offences were too low to 
act as a suitable deterrent in achieving the instrumental aim of OHS law to decrease the 
amount of industry related injury and death. Specific sentencing guidelines were also laid 
down in this case (HSE, 2002: 6; Wells, 2001: 33). The sharp increase in fine levels during 
the past century is reflected in recent statistics that show that the average fine imposed on 
companies in particular following death of a ‘worker’ in England and Wales was £28,908 in 
1996/7, £42,813 in 1997/8, and increasing to £66,911 in 1998/99 (CCA and Unison 2002, 
15).  
 
The past few years have also seen record fines for large corporations following public 
disasters and workplace deaths both in Australia and the United Kingdom. We mentioned in 
section one the fine of £1.5m awarded against Great Western Trains following the Southall 
rail crash; the £2m awarded against Thames Trains following the Paddington rail crash; and 
the Aus$2m fine awarded against Esso following the Longford gas explosion.103 However 
one must also consider the British Health and Safety Executive (HSE) statistics for the years 
2002/03 that report the average fine in cases following a death (that is work-related) as being 
only £29,564 compared to £38,055 the previous year which was a drop of 22%. The HSE 
                                                 
102  [1999] 2 All ER 249 
103  Wells (2001: 34) also refers to the £1.7m fine against Balfour Beatty following the collapse of a tunnel they were 
building for the Heathrow Airport express link in 1999 
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expressed disappointment to see the overall level of fine following a work-related death fall 
given the expectation that fine levels would continue to rise (HSE, 2003: 7). 
 
Commentators have stressed that if the financial penalty is to be used so widely against 
corporations and their personnel in relation to OHS and in particular following industrial 
deaths, then it should be developed to reflect the corporate offender as opposed to the 
general individual within society (Cahill and Cahill, 1999; Gobert, 1998: 2-6; Gobert and 
Punch, 2003: 221-233; Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999: 261). This would mean in some 
way linking the level of fine to the ability of the corporate offender to pay. It would also be 
necessary to reflect the reality of the large profits that are made and returned to shareholders 
and senior executives in large and in particular multinational corporations, at times at the 
expense of health and safety of workers and members of the public (Corns, 1991: 354; Wells, 
2001: 33-34). Examples of attempts at such an approach include the Australian Crimes Act 
1914 (Cth) that introduces pecuniary sanctions for corporations up to five times the level of 
those applied to individuals for similar offences, and the European Union’s antitrust laws 
(EEC Council Regulation Art. 15(2)) which provides provisions allowing fines of up to the 
percent of an offending companies previous year’s global turnover.104  Gunningham and 
Johnstone (1999: 275) draw attention to the possibility of imposing equity fines upon 
offending organisations, which they describe as a stock or share dilution measure (see also 
Fisse, 1983: 1233-7 and Gobert and Punch, 2003: 232). An equity fine could be used instead 
of imposing a large cash fine on an organisation, and would be a fine imposed against the 
security of the corporation. Gunningham and Johnstone see the benefit of such a measure in 
affecting management’s interests by ‘reducing the value of their share options and holdings’ 
in the organisation (at 275).   
 
Corporate Sanctions other than Fines – Where are we now? 
 
Although the fine is often the only court ordered sanction that is used against organisations 
and their personnel following conviction in relation to an industrial death in Australia, 
                                                 
104  Cited from Wells (2001: 34) where she also cites Fisse (1990: 228). For further discussion also see the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines in United States, as explored by Coffee (1999) 
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Canada and the United Kingdom, there are other existing possibilities (Australian Law 
Reform Commission, 1987; Cahill and Cahill, 1999; Fisse, 1985; Gobert and Punch, 2003: 
chapter seven; Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999: chapter seven; New South Wales Law 
Reform Commission, 2001). There are the existing options of imprisonment and 
disqualification for corporate personnel, although rarely used, and also the remedial order 
requiring the offender to remedy the breach of the OHS statute or traditional criminal law 
that caused or could have caused a risk to the health and safety of workers and members of 
the public. Many of the more contemporary sanctioning options for organisations and their 
personnel are generally only explored in academic work and rarely been discussed or 
implemented generally into the criminal justice framework and in particular in the OHS 
statutes.  But before we discuss court ordered sanctions however, it is worth mentioning 
briefly enforcement action that OHS regulatory authorities as opposed to the courts can take 
against organisations and their personnel following an industrial death.   
Regulatory authorities in particular are able to utilise panoply of enforcement measures once 
there is evidence of a breach of regulatory standards. As we have discussed in section one, 
damage need not have occurred from the breach as OHS law is concerned more with 
processes and duties than outcomes. Usually, however, when an industrial death has 
occurred, such an aggravating circumstance means enforcement would consist of the 
regulatory agency bringing formal prosecutions through the courts system and not through 
the measures highlighted below.  
 
OHS regulatory authorities in most jurisdictions are, in addition to more informal measures, 
able to issue improvement notices and prohibition notices (see in particular Johnstone, 
2004a: 403-419 for commentary on Australia).  An improvement notice requires a statutory 
contravention to be remedied within a specified time, and a prohibition notice prohibits an 
activity that poses an immediate threat to the health and safety of any person. The courts can 
enforce these notices in the event that they are not acted upon, or indeed are breached.105 In 
some Australian jurisdictions OHS regulators can also impose infringement notices (‘on-the-
spot fines’) or accept ‘enforceable undertakings’ from organisations that have breached their 
obligations under the OHS statute (see further Johnstone, 2004a: 419-420 and 422-426). 
                                                 
105  See for instance s 33(4) Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (UK) 
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(a) Imprisonment 
 
Once a conviction has resulted for breach of an OHS statute, the courts are able to use the 
imprisonment option against individuals (an organisational legal personality such as a 
corporation could not practically be imprisoned). Although imprisonment is only available in 
very limited circumstances and very rarely utilised as an option in sentencing corporate 
misconduct, its use has at least been recognised since the mid 1990s. 
 
Section five outlined the offences that can be committed by corporate officers under the 
Australian OHS statutes. Imprisonment is only available as a sanction in some of the 
Australian OHS statutes, in particular those of the Commonwealth, Victoria, Queensland, 
South Australia and the Northern Territory,106 and generally imprisonment is not a sanction 
for a breach of the corporate officer provisions alone. Imprisonment usually is only available 
for offences like contravening a prohibition notice, assaulting an inspector, or repeat 
offences. Corporate personnel can also be imprisoned following conviction for any of the 
traditional criminal law offences such as homicide (including gross negligent manslaughter). 
We have already highlighted such cases where this has occurred 
 
The position is similar in the England and Wales. Section 37 Health and Safety at Work Act 
1974 (UK) states ‘Where an offence under any of the relevant provisions committed by a 
body corporate is proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or to 
have been attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other 
similar office of the body corporate or a person who was purporting to act in any such 
capacity, he as well as the body corporate shall be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to 
be proceeded against and punished accordingly.’ This clause would only result in 
imprisonment where, for instance, an individual themselves could be proved to have 
breached a prohibition notice imposed by a health and safety inspector, a somewhat rare and 
                                                 
106  For a discussion of the possible sanctions under the current Australian OHS statutes, see Johnstone (2004: 440-
450). 
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more deliberate act.107 To date, only five people have been sent to prison for breach of OHS 
law in England and Wales, and none have been imprisoned in the last three years (HSE, 
2003: 11).  
 
Once individual senior personnel of organisations are convicted of an OHS offence, 
disqualification is also an option, through for instance the Company Director’s Disqualification 
Act 1986 (UK). However, there have only ever been eight directors disqualified for health 
and safety offences in England and Wales, and none in the last two years (HSE, 2003: 11).  
 
(b) Remedial orders 
 
In a few jurisdictions, the courts are also able, in addition or instead of any penalty, to issue a 
remedial order following a breach of an OHS statute. The court may order within a certain 
period of time that a person (corporate or individual) take ‘such steps as are specified’ for 
remedying the particular situation that led to breach of OHS law (see sections 113 and 117 
of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW) and section 42 Health and Safety at Work 
Act 1974 (UK)). Failure to adhere to the court order could put the person charged with 
implementing the remedial order in contempt of court. 
 
(c) Winding up the organisation as a sanction 
 
In her review of non-financial organisational penalties, Wells (2001: 37-39) discusses a 
variety of more original organisational sanctions presently utilised in Canada and the United 
States of America. She notes that the equivalent of corporate imprisonment, corporate 
dissolution or compulsory winding up, has been used in some jurisdictions of the United 
States in cases of corporations formed for an illegal purpose.108 Gunningham and Johnstone 
liken this sanction to the organisational equivalent of capital punishment, although unlike 
capital punishment, they point out such a measure need not be permanent (1999: 274). They 
suggest that in the most extreme circumstances when an organisation is a danger either to 
                                                 
107 See also s 52 Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985 (Vic) and more generally Johnstone (2004a: 433-435). For a 
full list of the offences that can result in imprisonment of corporate personnel in relation to health and safety at 
work, see in particular s33 (4) Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (UK) and Johnstone (2004a: 432-435). 
108  Referring to Heine (1999: 246) 
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the public or its workers then ‘the blunt instrument’ may well be justified. Wells (2001: 37) 
also notes that since 1988 United States federal courts have been able to restrain a convicted 
corporation from acting in specific ways,109 and Box (1983: chapter two) suggests that 
nationalisation for a limited time should also be an option once an organisation has been 
convicted of a particularly grave criminal offence. However such severe sanctions as these 
do not apply in OHS regulatory frameworks in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom 
although we argue that policy makers might consider their introduction for extreme cases.  
 
(d) Adverse publicity orders 
 
Commentators also note the potential benefit of utilising adverse publicity orders following 
organisational conviction against image weary corporations as part of general regulatory 
enforcement strategies (Cahill and Cahill, 1999; Gobert and Punch, 2003: 236-239; 
Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999: 263-6; and Wells, 2001: 37-38). This sanction is available 
for OHS offences in New South Wales (see Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000(NSW) 
section 115), in the Australian Capital Territory where a manslaughter conviction has been 
recorded under the new manslaughter provisions (see Crimes (Industrial Manslaughter) 
Amendment Act 2003 (ACT) section 49E(2)  – see below), under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines of Organisations (United States Sentencing Commission, 1991; and Gunningham and 
Johnstone, 1999: 263-266) and in the Canadian province of Nova Scotia through the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1996 (Nova Scotia) (see section 75). The regulatory OHS 
authorities in England and Wales, Victoria and Queensland in particular have started to 
compile a list of OHS convictions and/or prosecutions on their websites, in a less formal 
strategy of using adverse publicity.110 
 
(e) Corporation probation 
 
Another important sanction, yet to be introduced into Australian OHS statutes, is corporate 
probation, which enables a company to be placed under probational surveillance and or 
                                                 
109  Referring to US v Allegheny Bottling Co. (1988) 695 FSupp 856 
110  See http://www.hse-databases.co.uk/prosecutions/ 
  and http://www.workcover.vic.gov.au/vwa/home.nsf/pages/prosecutions  
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organisational processes and procedures reformed following criminal conviction. Already 
used in Canada and the United States, Wells (2001: 38) suggests that this ‘judicially mandated 
restructuring of internal corporate processes’ paid for by the offending organisation could be 
at least as effective as the financial penalty and could be modified to contain elements both 
punitive and rehabilitative.111  Gunningham and Johnstone (1999: 266) argue that the 
supervisory order or corporate probation is a way of overcoming many of the deficiencies 
which the fine brings to the organisational context, and suggest that such orders would 
enable the courts to require an OHS offender to develop and implement an appropriate 
form of systematic OHS management (see also Parker and Connolly, 2002). The authors 
highlight three different forms of supervision that could be part of an organisational 
sanctions framework, with the one chosen depending on the severity of the breach of 
regulatory law and the situation of the offender. These (see also Bergman, 1992: 1313) are: 
(i) internal discipline orders (a court order that the organisation investigate the offence it has 
committed and provide a report to the court about the disciplinary proceedings it has 
conducted);  
(ii) organisational reform orders (which involve a limited period of judicial monitoring of the 
activities of the convicted company, through recognised reporting, record keeping and 
auditing controls designed to increase internal accountability and to improve OHS systems); 
and  
(iii) punitive injunctions (which insist on the development of innovative OHS management 
systems).  
 
(f) Community service orders 
 
Another option highlighted by Gunningham and Johnstone (1999: 272-274) and Gobert and 
Punch (2003: 233-236) is the corporate community service order. Widely used in the non-
organisational context, rarely has this sanction been used in an organisational context. 
Gunningham and Johnstone (1999: 277) argue that community service could be easily be 
modified for application to the organisational offender and could allow the organisation to 
‘carry out research or socially useful projects which utilise the resources and the special skills 
                                                 
111  Referring to Note, Yale (1979: 365), Prefontaine (1999: 280), and the Sentencing Reform Act 1984(US) 18 USC 
paragraph 3551 
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of the corporation’, in some way related to the organisations original criminal offence. Again, 
the corporate community service order is available as a possible sanction in New South 
Wales (Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW) section 116, in the Australian Capital 
Territory after a manslaughter conviction (see Crimes (Industrial Manslaughter) Amendment Act 
2003 (ACT) section 49E(2) – see below) and under Nova Scotia’s occupational health and 
safety regime in Canada (Occupational Health and Safety Act 1996 (Nova Scotia), section75).  
 
Conclusions 
 
We argue that these wide-ranging, innovative and contemporary organisational sanctions can 
increase the deterrent effect of OHS and traditional criminal law prosecutions, and could 
also require OHS offenders to take steps to improve their systematic management of OHS, 
which would prevent further workplace injuries and death. In section seven we highlight the 
use of some of these sanctions in the recent reforms discussed earlier in sections four and 
five. Although by no means making wide use of these new sanctions, the new and proposed 
laws at least attempt to take into account the potential for more contemporary sanctions to 
be as effective and perhaps more appropriate than the financial penalty and are a starting 
point for a developed and contemporary organisational sanctions regime.      
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Section Seven 
The Forgotten Sanction Debate: Contemporary Reforms 
 
This section reviews the new legislative enactments and proposals (discussed in sections four 
and five) that have included sanctions as part of their reconstruction of organisational 
criminal accountability.  
 
Crimes (Industrial Manslaughter) Amendment Act 2003 (ACT) Provisions  
 
The Crimes (Industrial Manslaughter) Amendment Act 2003 (ACT) provides for an enhanced 
sanctions framework for employers and senior officers prosecuted under the Act that builds 
on existing OHS laws and more traditional criminal law. The maximum penalties for both 
employer and senior officer offences under the Act are $200,000, imprisonment for 20 years, 
or both. Such punishment levels were far more punitive than existing OHS and traditional 
criminal law in this jurisdiction.  
 
Under section 49E(2), if a court finds an employer guilty of the section 49C offence of 
industrial manslaughter outlined above in section four, in addition to or instead of any other 
penalty the court may impose, the court may order the employer to do one or more of the 
following:  
‘(a) take any action stated by the court to publicise — (i) the offence; and (ii) the deaths or 
serious injuries or other consequences resulting from or related to the conduct from which 
the offence arose; and (iii) any penalties imposed, or other orders made, because of the 
offence; (b) take any action stated by the court to notify one or more stated people of the 
matters mentioned in paragraph (a); (c) do stated things or establish or carry out a stated 
project for the public benefit even if the project is unrelated to the offence.’ 
 
 
Here the legislation is adopting the adverse publicity and community service sanction 
options that were discussed in section six above. According to section 49E(3), when making 
such orders, the court ‘may state a period within which the action must be taken, the thing 
must be done or the project must be established or carried out, and may also impose any 
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other requirement that it considers necessary or desirable for enforcement of the order or to 
make the order effective.’ 
 
Section 49E(4) states that the total cost to the employer of compliance with an order or 
orders under subsection (2) in relation to a single offence must not be more than $5,000,000 
(including any fine imposed for the offence). Section 49E(5) states also that if the court 
decides to make an order under subsection (2), ‘it must, in deciding the kind of order, take 
into account, as far as practicable, the financial circumstances of the corporation and the 
nature of the burden that compliance with the order will impose.’ Section 49E(7) provides 
that ‘if a corporation fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with an order under 
subsection (2)(a) or (b) within the stated period the court may, on application by the 
commissioner for occupational health and safety, by order authorise the commissioner— (a) 
to do anything that is necessary or convenient to carry out any action that remains to be 
done under the order and that it is still practicable to do; and (b) to publicise the failure of 
the corporation to comply with the order.’ 
 
Canadian Criminal Code Provisions 
 
In sentencing organisations convicted of a criminal offence under the Canadian Criminal Code, 
the newly inserted section 718.21 of the Code provides that the court should now consider 
the following when imposing sentence on an organisation convicted of any criminal offence:  
‘the advantage realised by the organisation as a result of the offence; the degree of planning 
involved in carrying out the offence and the duration and complexity of the offence; whether 
the organisation has attempted to conceal its assets, or convert them, in order to show that it 
is not able to pay a fine or make restitution; the impact that the sentence would have on the 
economic viability of the organization and the continued employment of its employees; the 
cost to public authorities of the investigation and prosecution of the offence; any regulatory 
penalty imposed on the organization or one of its representatives in respect of the conduct 
that formed the basis of the offence; whether the organization was - or any of its 
representatives who were involved in the commission of the offence were - convicted of a 
similar offence or sanctioned by a regulatory body for similar conduct; any penalty imposed 
by the organization on a representative for their role in the commission of the offence; any 
restitution that the organization is ordered to make or any amount that the organization has 
paid to a victim of the offence; and any measures that the organization has taken to reduce 
the likelihood of it committing a subsequent offence.’ 
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Section 732.1 (3) (3.1) of the Canadian Criminal Code deals with probation orders. These can 
already be served upon corporations following conviction of a criminal offence in some 
jurisdictions of Canada. The new law lists additional conditions of such probations order, 
and these include: 
 
‘…that the offender: make restitution to a person for any loss or damage that they suffered 
as a result of the offence; establish policies, standards and procedures to reduce the 
likelihood of the organization committing a subsequent offence; communicate those policies, 
standards and procedures to its representatives; and report to the court on the 
implementation of those policies, standards and procedures;  identify the senior officer who 
is responsible for compliance with those policies, standards and procedures; provide, in the 
manner specified by the court, the following information to the public, namely, (i) the 
offence of which the organization was convicted, (ii) the sentence imposed by the court, and 
(iii) any measures that the organization is taking - including any policies, standards and 
procedures established under paragraph (b) - to reduce the likelihood of it committing a 
subsequent offence; and comply with any other reasonable conditions that the court 
considers desirable to prevent the organization from committing subsequent offences or to 
remedy the harm caused by the offence.’ 
 
 
Here again we see the use of the adverse publicity sanction against a convicted organisation 
through use of additional conditions attached to a probation order. Under the new law 
however, the court should bear in mind that (section 732.1 (3) (3.2))  ‘before making an 
order under paragraph (3.1)(b), a court shall consider whether it would be more appropriate 
for another regulatory body to supervise the development or implementation of the policies, 
standards and procedures referred to in that paragraph.’  One might question whether the 
court is the appropriate body to undertake such a supervisory function. 
 
Although the maximum level of a fine is already unlimited for indictable offences under 
Canadian federal law, there is a limit on the level of a fine for a summary offence committed 
by organisations. This is updated so that section 735(1)b which sets the limit of a fine for 
summary offences at C$100,000. 
 
The Victorian Proposals 
 
Following conviction of the offences of corporate manslaughter and negligently causing 
serious injury by a body corporate as proposed by the Victorian Government in the Crimes 
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(Workplace Deaths and Serious Injuries) Bill 2001, the proposals dealt specifically with an 
innovative sanctions regime that would apply. Under section 14(D)(2) of the Bill: 
‘The court must impose on a body corporate a fine proportional to the size of the body 
corporate, taking into account-- 
(a) the number of employees of the body corporate and the entities, within the 
meaning of the Corporations Act, it controls; and 
(b) the number of persons, including independent contractors and outworkers, 
providing services to, or relating to, the body corporate and the entities it controls; 
and 
(c) if appropriate, the consolidated gross operating revenue for the last preceding 
financial year of the body corporate and the entities it controls; and 
(d) if appropriate, the value of the consolidated gross assets at the end of the last 
preceding financial year of the body corporate and the entities it controls.’ 
  
Under section 14(D)(4), in addition to or instead of any other penalty the court might 
impose on the body corporate, the court could order the body corporate to do one or more 
of the following: 
‘(a) to take any action specified by the court to publicise (for example, to advertise on 
television or in daily newspapers)-  
(i) the offence; and  
(ii) any deaths or serious injuries or other consequences arising or resulting from the 
offence; and  
(iii) any penalties imposed, or other orders made, as a result of the commission of 
the offence; 
(b) to take any action specified by the court to notify one or more specified persons or 
classes of persons of the matters referred to in paragraph (a) (for example, to publish a 
notice in an annual report or to distribute a notice to shareholders of the body corporate);  
(c) to perform specified acts or establish or carry out a specified project for the public 
benefit (for example, to develop and operate a community service) even if the project is 
unrelated to the offence.’ 
 
Here again we see proposals utilising the possibility of introducing the adverse publicity and 
community service sanction options into the organisational framework. 
 
In making an order under section 14(D)(4) of the Bill, ‘the court may specify a period within 
which the action must be taken, the act must be performed or the project must be 
established or carried out and may also impose any other requirement that it considers 
necessary or expedient for enforcement of the order or to make the order effective.’ Under 
section 14(D)(6) the total cost to the body corporate of compliance with an order or orders 
under sub-section (4) must not exceed- ‘(a) in the case of a body corporate found guilty of 
corporate manslaughter, Aus$5,000,000; and (b) in the case of a body corporate found guilty 
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of negligently causing serious injury, $2,000,000.’ Under section 14(D)(7) if the court decides 
to make an order under sub-section (4), it must, in determining the type of order, take into 
account, as far as practicable, ‘the financial circumstances of the body corporate and the 
nature of the burden that compliance with the order will impose.’ Finally, under section 
14(D)(9), ‘if a body corporate fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with an order 
under sub-section (4)(a) or (b) within the specified period, if any, the court may, on 
application by the Victorian Workcover Authority, by order authorise that Authority- (a) to 
do anything that is necessary or expedient to carry out any action that remains to be done 
under the order and that it is still practicable to do; and (b) to publicise the failure of the 
body corporate to comply with the order.’ Nothing in sub-section (9) prevents contempt of 
court proceedings from being started or continued against a body corporate that has failed to 
comply with an order. 
 
The British Proposals 
 
The British Government’s year 2000 consultation document on corporate killing is the least 
innovative in relation to organisational sanctions. All that the document suggests is that the 
Law Commission’s recommendation that the court (in addition to existing powers given to 
regulatory agencies) should have power to make remedial orders should be accepted, with 
the responsibility for drawing up the order resting with whichever agency is prosecuting 
(Home Office, 2000: 21). Under section 5 (1) of the Law Commission’s Draft Involuntary 
Manslaughter Bill (Law Commission, 1996a), it is stated: 
‘(1) A court before which a corporation is convicted of corporate killing may … order the 
corporation to take such steps, within such time, as the order specifies for remedying the 
failure in question  and any matter which appears to the court to have resulted from the 
failure and been the cause or one of the causes of the death…  (5) A corporation which fails 
to comply with an order under this section is guilty of an offence and liable – (a) on 
conviction on indictment to a fine; or (b) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding 
£20,000.’ 
 
The enforcement authority would also, it is suggested, be given the task of checking 
compliance with such an order and reporting back to the courts where it was necessary. 
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Conclusions 
 
As this section has demonstrated, the recent involuntary manslaughter reforms have begun 
to utilise new sanctioning options to increase corporate criminal accountability. However, it 
is generally only the adverse publicity order, the community service order, the probation 
order, and the remedial order that have been used in the organisational context, in addition 
to the fine and imprisonment options (the latter rarely being used). The wide-ranging 
additional sanctioning options, including the contemporary fining methods and more 
interventionist forms of organisational sanctions have not been explored. Most 
commentators in this area would agree that this reluctance to use the full range of possible 
sanctions is limiting the preventive potential (through deterrence and corporate 
rehabilitation) of OHS and traditional criminal law prosecutions.  
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Section Eight 
Reforms To Existing Occupational Health And Safety Statutes As A Forgotten 
Possibility  
 
OHS reforms have not been confined to the development of manslaughter provisions. In 
both Australia and the English OHS regulatory reviews and strategies have attempted to 
revitalise existing OHS law, instead of developing new traditional criminal law offences both 
for organisations and individuals. These proposals and reviews are premised on perceiving 
the systems of both traditional criminal law and OHS law as complementary rather than 
mutually exclusive. Indeed, some commentators who see the focus on developing traditional 
criminal law rather than on strengthening sanctions under existing OHS statutes  as a 
worrying trend, perhaps to the detriment of worker safety (Appleby, 2003; Carson and 
Johnstone, 1990; Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999).  These commentators argue that the 
sanctioning framework for OHS contraventions should be strengthened, by ratcheting up 
penalties for breach of existing duties by corporation and individuals, including a wider use 
of imprisonment as a sanctioning option against organisational personnel and increased fine 
levels for organisations. 
 
Appleby (2003) suggests in England and Wales it would be better to ‘rehabilitate the status 
of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974’ for many industrial deaths by emphasising its 
breach is truly ‘criminal’ (OHS law is criminal law) through wider use of imprisonment, 
increased fines, and more effective prosecution against companies and individuals. Carson 
and Johnstone (1990) suggest to rely on individual offences such as manslaughter only where 
death occurs is to devalue and differentiate OHS laws from other criminal law when they 
should be perceived as equally criminal. They argue that OHS policy makers should try to 
arrest the tendency for OHS offences to be seen as ‘quasi-criminal’, and should reassert that 
OHS law is truly criminal and the harm caused by breaching and derogating from OHS 
standards is as serious as that caused by breaching traditional criminal law. OHS law also has 
the strength that it can focus attention on proactive as opposed to reactive measures, 
punishing risk whether or not harm has occurred. Harm that has not occurred but could 
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occur is as culpable as harm that has occurred, and OHS law allows such risk as apposed to 
outcome to be prosecuted.  
 
As a means to achieve this increased criminalisation of OHS law, Glazebrook (2002) 
suggests creating imprisonable offences under existing OHS statutes by extending directors 
duties through an offence of causing death or serious injury by breaching OHS regulations, 
and Carson and Johnstone (1990) suggest the inclusion into the Occupational Health and Safety 
Act 1985 (Vic) of an offence of causing death through violation of the Act itself or of its 
attendant regulations, or alternatively, an offence of industrial manslaughter could be 
incorporated into the Act. Another possibility is that the OHS offences be enacted in 
traditional criminal statutes like the Crimes Acts or Criminal Codes. 
 
Wells (2001) and Tombs and Whyte (2003) accept the functional role of OHS legislation in 
addressing some corporate harm, although they suggest it is inappropriate for prosecuting 
companies that cause death through dangerous conduct precisely because OHS offences  
within the current framework devalue harm caused. They support calls for more punitive 
OHS legislation and its more effective investigation and enforcement but only in addition to 
increased use of ‘traditional’ criminal law, which has its own special value to them (Wells 
2001: 21-31; Tombs and Whyte, 2003: 17-18).  
 
With many of the new traditional criminal law offences that were outlined in section four 
and five, it could be argued such offences are merely existing regulatory OHS offences under 
a different name and based on outcome as apposed to risk created, with similar levels of 
sanctions. The distinction between new corporate killing law and existing OHS law in 
England and Wales ‘could be purely a semantic one…’ (Christian 2001) as no additional 
sanctions following conviction for the new British corporate killing offence have been 
proposed. If fines are not set higher than existing fines in the OHS statute, no sanction 
difference would be evident between OHS and traditional criminal laws. The Health and 
Safety at Work Act 1974, in particular, provides already for unlimited fines when cases are 
tried in the Crown Court, and courts have insisted (as discussed above) that fines under the 
 
 
82
Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 should increase. There is evidence they have substantially 
increased.112  
 
But the main focus of OHS reviews has been on increasing levels of fines, more innovative 
sanctions, increased use of imprisonment for individual breaches, and possible reform of the 
provisions dealing with individual criminal liability. Perhaps the individual liability rules 
contained in existing OHS law are archaic and new duties upon both directors and senior 
personnel in addition to, rather than dependent upon, existing duties on organisations need 
to be developed? Another alternative is to perhaps introduce new discrete offences into 
OHS law, as apposed to separate manslaughter offences that fall within a separate traditional 
criminal law system, thereby creating two complementary criminal law systems.  
 
Indeed, in 1995 the Australian Industry Commission (1995: Vol I, 116 and 118, 
recommendation 16) recommended that, on the basis that the ‘maximum penalties 
(including fines, imprisonment and licence revocation) should provide the courts with the 
ability to impose a penalty which is sufficient to act as a credible deterrent to others, after 
allowing for the probabilities of detection and conviction’, and assuming that ‘[h]igher 
maxima are likely to lead to higher penalties … all jurisdictions consider an immediate 
increase in the maximum penalties in their OHS legislation to the levels in Commonwealth 
Seafarer OHS legislation [$100,000 for individuals and $500,000 for corporations]. 
Governments should also consider further increases in their maximum penalties over time.’ 
Consequently, in the past few years the maximum penalties for serious OHS contraventions 
have been considerably increased in New South Wales and Queensland States.  
 
The Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW) provides for maximum penalties of 
$825,000 for corporations and $82,500 for individuals who, being previous offenders, 
contravene the general duty provisions in sections eight to eleven of the Act, and maximum 
penalties of $550,000 for corporations and $55,000 for individuals who contravene those 
general duties but who have not previously offended. Maximum penalties for contraventions 
of the general duty provisions in the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld) were 
                                                 
112  See HSE (2002). This is not of course to say that the increases in fine levels are adequate (see also Wells, 2001: 
17-18) 
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increased in 2003, so that now, where a breach causes multiple deaths, the maximum fine is 
$150,000 for individuals; if the breach causes death or grievous bodily harm, $75,000; if the 
breach causes bodily harm, $56,250; and otherwise, $37,500. The maximum penalties for 
contraventions by corporations are five times these maxima for individuals (see Penalties and 
Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), section 181B).   
 
We also note that in April 2004 the Occupational Safety and Health Legislation Amendment and 
Repeal Bill 2004 was introduced in the Western Australian Legislative Assembly, and aimed to 
bring the maximum penalties in the Occupational Safety and Health Act 1984 (WA) into line 
with those available on the east coast of Australia. The Bill increased the maximum fine for a 
corporation committing a serious offence which was a first offence to $500,000, with 
subsequent offences incurring a maximum penalty of $625,000. 
 
This paper will deal briefly with two other jurisdictions who have announced proposals in 
the area of OHS penalties.113 
 
The British Proposals 
 
Under the Revitalising Health and Safety strategy (DETR, 2000), the British Government said it 
would ‘seek an early legislative opportunity, as Parliamentary time allows, to provide the 
Courts with greater sanctioning powers for health and safety crimes. The key measures 
envisaged are to extend the £20,000 maximum fine in the lower courts to a much wider 
range of offences which currently attract a maximum penalty of £5,000 and the provide the 
courts with the power to imprison for most health and safety offences… The Health and 
Safety Commission will advise ministers on the feasibility of consultees’ proposals for more 
innovative penalties’ (2000: 24). Despite the more punitive rhetoric, no Government 
legislation resulted.  
 
                                                 
113  Note also developments in this area within Canada and other Australian states such as Queensland and Western 
Australia which are not covered in this paper 
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The Government’s intentions were taken up by Lawrie Quinn MP in a private members bill, 
although given lack of government support, the Bill did not become law. The Health and 
Safety At Work (Offences) Bill 2003, as introduced into the House of Commons on 7th January 
2003, included proposals under a new schedule (6A) to be inserted into the Health and Safety 
at Work Act 1974. The schedule would have brought in a wider use of the crown court in 
trying and sentencing health and safety offenders therefore increasing the maximum 
sentences applicable to a wide range of offences. Financial penalty levels would be raised for 
some offences from the existing £5,000 if tried summarily to £20,000 with the additional 
option of six months imprisonment for senior officers implicated in the offences through 
section 37 of the Act (as highlighted in section five above). Those offences which already 
carry a £20,000 fine when tried summarily (including the general duty provisions under the 
Health and Safety at Work Act) would remain at this level but the option of imprisonment for 
six months would also be included. Where offences tried on indictment already have an 
existing unlimited fine option, this would stay the same, but now also include the option of 
imprisonment for up to two years. As discussed in section five above, the option of 
imprisonment for OHS offences at present is very narrow, and this Bill intended to increase 
attention to the seriousness of existing OHS law.  
 
The Health and Safety at Work (Offences) Bill 2004 was once again introduced as a Private 
Members Bill into the House of Commons by Andy Love MP on 10th February 2004. 
 
Victorian Government Review 
 
The Crimes (Workplace Deaths and Serious Injuries) Bill 2002 (Vic) proposed to increase 
maximum penalties under the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985 (Vic) for body 
corporates from $250,000 to $600,000 or $750,000. Senior officer offences would also be 
increased from $50,000 to a maximum of $120,000 or $150,000 and 12 months 
imprisonment. Following the defeat and then withdrawal of the proposals for industrial 
manslaughter and increased health and safety penalties contained in this Bill, the Victorian 
Government announced a review of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985 (Vic). The 
review reported early in April 2004 (see Maxwell, 2004) and emphasised the fundamental 
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difference between inchoate and strict liability criminal offences under the Occupational Health 
and Safety Act and breaches of ‘the general criminal law’ (Maxwell, 2004: 13-14). It concluded 
(Maxwell, 2004: 14) that manslaughter ‘properly remains within the province of the general 
criminal law’, but recognised that the ‘community in general – and employers and unions in 
particular – regard a culpable failure to provide a safe working environment as a matter of 
the utmost seriousness.’ It noted that the penalties for OHS contraventions in Victoria were 
still well below the levels recommended by the Industry Commission (1995), and 
considerably lower than the available penalties in New South Wales and Queensland, and 
recommended (Maxwell, 2004: 14 and chapter 35) that the Victorian Act be amended to 
provide for ‘substantial increase in the maximum monetary penalties for breach’, and that 
should be ‘available for first offenders where the breach of duty involves high-level 
culpability.’ It also recommended that alternative sanctions, particularly enforceable 
undertakings, adverse publicity orders and community service orders, be made available. 
Conclusions 
 
As can be seen from these two jurisdictions, existing alongside the proposals in relation to 
the development of existing traditional criminal law to deal with corporate criminal 
accountability are attempts to reform OHS statutes and the available penalties under those 
statutes. It may be that any approach considering how to increase corporate criminal 
accountability for industrial deaths should also focus on the existing OHS regulatory system 
and to enhancing the appeal and punitiveness of OHS law. Any attempts to utilise only 
traditional criminal law in the event of industrial death could otherwise lead to the 
downgrading of the status of OHS law when in fact reform should focus on ensuring that 
OHS law is truly criminal and should be seen as such. Indeed, as stressed by Appleby (2003) 
and Carson and Johnstone (1990), the failure to see OHS law as real criminal law can only 
lead to a less serious approach taken to OHS in general and its deterrence potential.   
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Section Nine 
Investigation- A Crucial Part of the Puzzle 
 
In the final section of this paper we focus briefly on problems with investigation and 
evidence gathering as they relate to the prosecution of organisations and senior personnel 
following industrial deaths. Some commentators have suggested that the reason many of the 
investigations following industrial deaths fail to identify the directing mind and moral 
culpability required by the identification doctrine under existing common law (see section 
two and three above) is not due to an inherent defect in the existing law, but because of the 
fact that investigations are not conducted properly due to inadequacies in police training and 
the resources of regulatory bodies (Appleby, 2002; Simpson, 2002; Slapper, 1999; Tombs 
and Whyte, 2003). Wells argues these factors have been perpetuated by the mistaken 
categorisation of industrial deaths as ‘accidents’ and not ‘crimes’ (Wells, 2001: 11-12).  
  
Wells is resistant to conclude legal technicalities corporations exploit will be resolved in 
favour of strict enforcement of any developed organisational criminal accountability laws, 
suggesting history shows corporate defendants ‘highly motivated and well placed to exploit 
the metaphysical gap between “the company” and its members’ (Wells, 2001: 124-126and 
see also Gobert and Punch, 2003). Sutton and Haines (2003: 152) suggest larger corporations 
can avoid prosecution because they have more resources to direct towards compliance 
efforts, and can appear more virtuous so that when doing the right things is not in a larger 
corporation’s best interests, it can afford better legal advice and devise schemes to remain 
within the letter of law whilst defying its spirit. They suggest larger companies have resources 
to dispute law and exploit its ambiguities to avoid prosecution (see also Gobert and Punch, 
2003).  
 
Perhaps existing law is not investigated and enforced effectively because political will to 
enforce the law is absent, and for this reason legal reform will be ineffective without 
strengthening the power base necessary to make laws effective (Slapper, 1999; Tombs and 
Whyte, 2003; Wells, 2001; Snider, 1991)? 
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The issue of the adequacy of investigation of industrial deaths has come to the forefront 
through newly implemented processes and reviews of existing processes in Australia and 
England and Wales. This paper shall briefly highlight one such development in England and 
Wales, although it is important to note also that reviews are under way in the Victorian 
Police Force and the recent Protocol for the Investigation and Provision of Advice in Relation to 
Workplace Deaths and Incidents of Serious Injury and Prosecutions Arising Therefrom has been 
published in New South Wales in January 2004. We shall not discuss here the related 
problems of misapplication of existing law and regulatory enforcement budgets, which in 
themselves could contribute greatly to the failure to enforce existing law effectively.  
 
The British Protocol 
 
The Work Related Deaths: Protocol for Liaison (HSE, 2003b) was a joint venture originally 
between the Police, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Health and Safety Executive in 
England and Wales, but has now expanded to take in other regulatory enforcement agencies. 
The Protocol was put together in recognition of the fact that the investigation of industrial 
death was not properly coordinated and there was a need to emphasise the importance of 
working together to ‘investigate thoroughly, and to prosecute appropriately, those 
responsible for work-related deaths in England and Wales’ (HSE, 2003b: 1). 
 
The stated aims and underlying principles of the Protocol are that (HSE, 2003b: 4):  
‘an appropriate decision concerning prosecution will be made based on a sound investigation 
of the circumstances surrounding work-related deaths; the police will conduct an 
investigation where there is an indication of the commission of a serious criminal offence 
(other than a health and safety offence), and HSE, the local authority or other enforcing 
authority will investigate health and safety offences. There will usually be a joint 
investigation, but on the rare occasions where this would not be appropriate, there will still 
be liaison and co-operation between the investigating parties; the decision to prosecute will 
be co-ordinated, and made without undue delay; the bereaved and witnesses will be kept 
suitably informed; and the parties to the protocol will maintain effective mechanisms for 
liaison’  
 
The Protocol however does not deal with the more pressing issues of both the resources of 
the OHS regulatory authority to effectively investigate an industrial death and the ability of 
the police to adequately investigate deaths that, being organisational in scope, differ 
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markedly from general criminal investigations. This has worried some commentators in the 
United Kingdom who are concerned that, whilst the Protocol is significant, ‘the issue of 
training and the provision of investigation manuals for the police and the HSE needs to be 
addressed’ (Appleby, 2003).   
 
Conclusions 
 
It is crucial to look carefully at the existing adequacy of investigations of industrial deaths, 
for commentators stress the need to consider this alongside changes to the law. It is not 
enough to change the law itself without also considering that there may be inherent faults in 
the enforcement of law as written. Although this issue has not been fully explored here, it is 
crucial to consider the adequacy of legal decisions taken within crown prosecution 
departments and the ability of regulators and police to investigate OHS breaches due to 
budget constraints and lack of specialisation in this organisational context. Crucially the 
effectiveness of police investigations in an organisational context must also be considered. 
We mention this all in this final section of the paper as it is another important consideration 
that has not been extensively dealt with or considered in many of the jurisdictions covered in 
the paper. Yet policy makers should bear in mind these issues if the intention of reforms is 
to increase accountability of organisations following industrial deaths.   
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Section Ten 
Conclusions 
 
Looking back on the past decade, it is hard not to see at least the potential for rapid change 
in the way developed Commonwealth legal systems deal with organisational criminal 
responsibility for industrial deaths. Although the issue of how the law deals with 
organisational harm has been something the Australian, Canadian and British legal systems 
have struggled to deal with since the early 1900s, the past decade has seen change in the 
context of industrial death in certain jurisdictions on a level not seen since the 1940s. During 
the past decade Australian, British and Canadian law reformers have begun to address 
organisational criminal responsibility for industrial deaths. 
 
The Australian Commonwealth and Australian Capital Territory and the Canadian Federal 
jurisdictions have introduced into their legal systems significant new laws for attributing 
criminal responsibility to organisations. These reforms move away from the identification 
doctrine which over the years has been utilised by the courts when attributing criminal 
responsibility to organisations for the vast majority of traditional criminal law offences  (see 
section two above), towards attribution rules with a more holistic, and arguably realistic, way 
of understanding exactly how organisations think and act, and how they should be held to 
account. These reforms (discussed in section four above) have the potential to enable 
prosecution of organisations with inadequate management systems and organisational 
cultures, which fail to address themselves as a ‘whole’ to the question of the OHS of workers 
and, in some jurisdictions, members of the pubic affected by their particular industrial 
activity. They also present regulators with the possibility of prosecuting a new kind of 
organisational fault under traditional criminal law, in addition to prosecutions under OHS 
statutes.     
 
The Australian Capital Territory has also introduced specific industrial manslaughter crimes 
(see sections four and five above), the first such offences in the jurisdictions we have 
examined in this paper. Rather than utilising the existing common law of homicide (murder 
and manslaughter), the ACT jurisdiction has opted for specific new criminal offences that 
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recognise the unique character of organisational inadequacies that result in death of workers, 
although the new provisions do not cover deaths of members of the public. 
 
Reform of corporate manslaughter law has also been proposed in Queensland, England and 
Wales and Victoria. Victoria’s proposed organisational criminal accountability legislation 
(discussed in sections four, five and seven above) was defeated in a hail of angry accusations 
that the law had failed to prosecute corporate cowboys, and that politicians had ‘let them off 
the hook.’ The Victorian Government now seems strangely quiet on corporate manslaughter 
legislation that in 2001 it said was so necessary and which would have been passed if not for 
an opposition party using their numbers in the Upper House (the Legislative Council) to 
defeat the proposed legislation.  
 
The British Government seems to be forever in a process of consultation and redrafting of a 
corporate killing law that was first discussed some ten years ago. The new proposals are due 
out any day now, but many with an interest in this area of law are hesitant to conclude it is 
the intention of the Government ever to see such a law on the statute books. Queensland 
Government’s proposals are not to be implemented for the time being, and the Government 
has not expressed a clear reason for abandoning the proposals. 
 
Nevertheless, the overview this paper has provided of issues in the development of 
organisational criminal responsibility following industrial deaths suggests that the debate is 
likely to preoccupy Governments for some time to come.  
 
What is unclear at this stage is how the legislation that has already been passed will be 
enforced and prosecuted, and section nine dealt briefly with some of the concerns policy 
makers must consider if new laws are to have a chance of success. The new legal provisions 
are legalistic and highly complex and there will no doubt be a series of high profile legal 
disputes in the courts when an organisation or its personnel are finally prosecuted for one of 
the new offences. Corporate lawyers will doubtless seek to exploit loopholes in the law and 
question its meaning and the judiciary will then be called upon to interpret the legislation. 
Here again there is space for the legislative purposes to be undermined by the traditional 
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judicial attitude towards organisational criminal responsibility, as outlined in section two 
above.  
 
A further question is whether politicians and the public should be resisting the calls for 
traditional criminal law reform and instead should be focusing on strengthening existing 
OHS law. We suggest that the sidelining of OHS law is a troubling prospect, and that 
although it is agreed that the traditional criminal law (manslaughter and new industrial 
manslaughter offences) may well be appropriate in certain circumstances, such offences are 
only a reaction to industrial death that has already occurred. It is crucially important that 
attention is focused on prevention, and here more punitive use of the criminal law in OHS 
prosecutions could potentially provide the improvements in OHS that perhaps the 
traditional criminal law cannot. 
   
We also suggest that alongside the introduction of new traditional criminal laws and the 
increased punitiveness of existing OHS law, policy makers should also focus on improving 
investigation in the enforcement of existing criminal law in the organisational context. A 
need for well informed and competent investigations into organisational harm is crucial if 
laws implemented are to be effectively enforced, and recent development in developing 
procedures for investigation of industrial deaths canvassed in section nine above is timely 
and necessary. Such an approach needs to be backed up by adequate training of 
investigators, inspectors and prosecutors. Our paper does not extensively touch on the 
perennial question of adequate resources of OHS regulatory agencies. The effectiveness of 
any strengthening of laws to allow more effective prosecution of organisational criminality is 
contingent on regulatory enforcement agencies being able to investigate and enforce the laws 
alongside the police and the state prosecution apparatus. 
      
We discussed the organisational sanctions debate at length in sections six and seven, and the 
ACT and Canadian reforms outlined in section seven provide examples of sanctions that 
might more effectively punish organisational criminality once it has been prosecuted 
successfully. However, it is by no means clear whether or how the judiciary will use these 
new sanctions once charges under the new provisions are proved. Further, the new laws 
utilise only a small number of the organisational sanctions options that have been discussed 
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in the academic literature, leaving many innovative and perhaps effective sanctions as only 
theoretical possibilities. 
 
It is important to remember what this whole debate is about and why the question of 
organisational criminal responsibility has become so important. What must be our crucial 
aim in all this talk of law reform? The aim of reforming this area of law must always be to 
improve OHS in industry. It must be to reduce industrial death and injury arising from 
organisational failure to develop and implement adequate OHS measures to ensure injuries 
and fatalities do not occur in the first place. This leads to the question of what will best 
achieve this aim in the long term. Having said this, we also acknowledge the importance of 
other criminal law rationales in bringing manslaughter prosecutions, most importantly 
symbolic motivations such as denunciation and retribution (see Haines and Hall, 2004). 
 
Will the bad publicity associated with increased use of reformed traditional criminal law in 
tandem with OHS prosecutions, and the threat of imprisonment and hefty sanctions, 
increase the levels of attention paid to OHS policies, procedures and practices and therefore 
reduce industrial deaths/injuries? Will a well-coordinated approach to responsive 
enforcement (see Johnstone, 2004b), including manslaughter prosecutions for egregious 
cases resulting in workplace fatalities and large and varied sanctions for non-compliance with 
OHS statutory provisions, increase voluntary compliance (Gunningham and Johnstone, 
1999) with OHS law and lead to positive gains. Another question that must be asked is 
whether changes in the law may just increase the willingness of business to close up their 
systems to inspection and evade effective prosecution of new laws (CBI, 2001; Haines, 
1997)?  
 
What is clear is that new laws passed and laws proposed must look to contextualise, rather 
than decontextualise, the harm caused by industrial activity. Historically, OHS prosecutions 
have been criticised on the grounds that organisational offenders simply pleading guilty to 
OHS offences and that the prosecution process decontextualises and trivialises non-
compliance with OHS standards (see Johnstone, 2000/2003). If the reforms described in 
this paper enable traditional criminal laws such as murder and manslaughter to be more 
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widely and effectively utilised, then perhaps at least the harm caused by industrial activity will 
be ranked alongside the harm caused by gun violence or drink driving for instance.  
   
But perhaps we should put aside the politics of law and order when it comes to OHS, and 
not follow the general trends in addressing ‘street crime.’ Perhaps we should focus on doing 
the best to prevent in advance the carnage caused by lack of interest, incompetent OHS 
management, and the economic pressure of doing business that outs profits ahead of 
effective systematic OHS management. We acknowledge that unbridled attention to 
traditional criminal law could deflect attention away from proactive models to reduce 
industrial deaths and injuries and away from the important contribution the existing OHS 
statutes make to preventing workplace injury, disease and death. Properly enforced and 
sanctioned, OHS laws can be both proactive and punitive, whereas manslaughter and 
traditional criminal law is generally only reactive. We suggest that it is worth considering the 
option of bringing manslaughter and outcome based offences within the existing OHS 
regulatory regimes alongside a ratcheting up of punishment for breach of OHS standards. 
This would reduce the divide between OHS regulatory regimes and the ‘traditional criminal 
law.’ 
 
A crucial issue not explored in this paper is the issue of ‘justice’ for those whose lives have 
been destroyed or severely affected by organisational harm and those left behind to mourn 
the preventable loss of their partners, relatives and colleagues. The questions relating to the 
issue of preventing industrial death, responding to industrial death, and achieving justice for 
all those involved in this debate are being sought more widely than in the past. This is a 
welcome developed that recognises organisational harm for what it is. And it must be hoped 
for that innovative thinking and careful reform may bring some urgently needed answers, to 
the benefit of OHS.     
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